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Informed Trading and Its Regulation
Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, & Gabriel V. Rauterberg*
Informed trading-trading on information not yet reflected in a stock's price-
drives the stock market. Such informational advantages can arise from astute analysis of
varied pieces ofpublic news, from just released public information, or from confidential
information from inside afirm. We argue that these disparate types of trading are all
better regulated as part of the broader phenomenon of informed trading. Informed
trading makes share prices more accurate, enhancing the allocation of capital, but also
makes markets less liquid, which is costly to the efficiency of trade. Informed trading thus
poses a fundamental trade-off in how it affects the two principal functions served by the
stock market-information and liquidity.
This Article takes this basic tradeoff and develops an analytic framework, drawing
on microstructure economics, modern finance theory, and the theory of the firm, to
identify which types of informed trade are socially desirable, which are undesirable, and
how best to regulate the market as a result. A key observation is that the time horizon of
the information on which an informed trade is based-the latency before it would
otherwise be reflected in price-crucially determines both the strategies of those trading
on it and the social value ofsuch trading.
Disaggregating traders and trading strategies in this way provides powerful new
insights into how we can use regulation to deter socially undesirable forms of informed
trading and promote socially desirable ones. The central contribution of this Article is
the systematic application of the insights of our framework to illuminate a vast array of
legal rules and doctrines-typically considered in isolation-in light of their effects on
different kinds of informed trade. These include Rule 1Ob-5 as applied to insider trading,
Exchange Act Section 16(b), Reg. NMS, mandatory disclosure rules, Reg. FD, New
York's so-called "Insider Trading 2.0 "policy, and various stock exchange regulations.
The Article thus lays the foundation for evaluating this array of rules, and on this basis
suggests a series of reforms to the current framework of securities law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Informed trading-trading on information or analysis not yet reflected in a stock's
price-drives much of the stock market.' Such information enables a more accurate
appraisal of a stock's value than what its current price implies. The trader may have
obtained this information from astute analysis of publicly available information, from
public information that has just been disclosed and is not yet reflected in a stock's price, or
from confidential information possessed by the issuer of the stock or by another entity,
such as a potential acquirer.
No issue in securities law has garnered more attention from law and economics
scholars and the larger public alike than insider trading, in which a trader transacts based
on nonpublic information obtained from inside an issuer or another entity.2 The legal
1. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 243 (2002) (explaining the pervasive role
of trading in the stock market based on nonpublic information); Kenneth French & Richard Roll, Stock Return
Variances: The Arrival ofNew Information and the Reaction ofTraders, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 9 (1986) (discussing
trading on private information).
2. For just a sampling of seminal early work in this area, see HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET 131-45 (1966) [hereinafter MANNE, INSIDER TRADING] (arguing that insider trading is efficient
because it promotes pricing accuracy and entrepreneurialism); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1, 21 (1993) (arguing that the prohibition on insider
trading is best justified as a property right protection for information); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and
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literature has thought far less about how the other forms of informed trading should be
regulated and how current law in fact affects them already. The ambition of this article is
to advance thinking on both fronts. To that end, we argue that both types of insider trading
(by insiders within and without an issuer) are better regulated as part of the more general
phenomenon of informed trading, and that securities regulation could better promote social
welfare if it was designed with an awareness of what all types of informed trading have in
common and how they differ.3
The basics of microstructure economics reveal that informed trading leads to more
accurate share prices,4 which in turn increase the efficiency with which the economy
allocates goods and services.5 However, informed trading also reduces market liquidity, 6
which makes trading costlier and leads to a variety of inefficiencies. There is thus a
fundamental tradeoff in how informed trading affects the two principal social functions
served by equity markets-providing accurate prices and facilitating liquidity. This Article
takes this basic tradeoff and uses the tools of microstructure economics, modem finance
theory, and the theory of the firm to try to identify which forms of informed trade are in
fact socially desirable, which are socially undesirable, and how to best regulate the market
as a result. More specifically, we argue that given this difficult tradeoff, two key factors
are crucial to determining the social utility of a trading practice-the strength of any
incentives it provides for the generation of new information by traders and what one could
call the "counterfactual latency" of that trading practice-the period of time between when
given information would come to be incorporated into a stock's price with and without the
given trading practice. The time horizon of the information on which an informed trade is
based-the latency before it would otherwise be reflected in price-crucially determines
both the strategies of those trading on it and the social value of such trading.8
Disaggregating traders and trading strategies in this way provides powerful new insights
into how we can use regulation to deter socially undesirable forms of informed trading and
promote socially desirable ones.
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 343, 347-48 (1979)
(analyzing the proper scope of the disclose-or-abstain rule); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 862 (1982) (arguing that permitting insider trading may be
an efficient way to compensate corporate managers); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider
Trading, Markets, and "Negative" Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1238-43 (2001)
(arguing that widespread insider trading would drive market analysts out of business with deleterious
consequences for the informational quality of securities prices); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply
to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967) (arguing that insider trading may
be injurious because it deters investors who perceive it as unfair from trading in securities).
3. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 194 (introducing a general idea of informed trading).
4. See infra Part 11.C.4.
5. See infra Part II.I.1.
6. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 299-303; see also infra Part ll.C.3.
7. See infra Part 11I.B.2.
8. See Markus Baldauf & Joshua Mollner, High-Frequency Trading and Market Performance (Working
Paper, Oct. 2015), https://ssm.com/abstract-2674767 (noting this basic microstructure trade-off).
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Essentially, the welfare case is strongest for promoting trading strategies where the
prospect of profit generally induces robust information gathering activity and when the
content of that information would not otherwise become reflected in public stock prices for
a considerable period of time without that trading strategy. The case for permitting a
strategy is weakest when the information-gathering incentives are weak and the
information incorporated in price by the trading strategy would have rapidly become
incorporated anyway.
The emphasis we place on counterfactual latency leads us to ask some questions that
seem to have been neglected previously. For instance, what is the typical latency between
when an insider transacts based on material nonpublic information and when that
information would have definitively otherwise been incorporated in stock price due to a
public disclosure. We develop a dataset through coding SEC litigation releases to explore
the typical time lag between when insider traders transact and when the information on
which they trade would have otherwise become public-and report the results.9
A central contribution of this Article is the systematic application of our framework's
insights to illuminate a vast array of legal rules and doctrines that importantly affect
different kinds of informed trading, and how those rules might be reformed in light of this
fact. Informed trading is currently affected by a complex, and far from coherent, jumble of
legal rules. 10 Relevant federal provisions include rules coming out of the case law
interpreting Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")''
and Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated thereunder (neither of which explicitly refers to trading on
non-public information), Exchange Act Section 16(b) (requiring insiders to return to the
issuer profits made from short-swing trading),12 the Exchange Act's mandatory disclosure
regime (requiring Form 1OKs, 1OQs, and 8Ks), Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD)
(requiring immediate public disclosure of material information given privately to analysts
or particular traders), and Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS)(setting forth the
basic rules of equity market structure). 13 Certain provisions of state law and stock exchange
regulations are also relevant. 14
Under this welter of provisions, some informed trades are prohibited or deterred,
while others are allowed or in some cases even encouraged. Our analysis has both good
news and bad news with regard to this current regulatory structure. The regulation of
trading based on inside information, despite its tortured doctrinal basis in Rule 1 Ob-5, has
more policy coherence than many commentators appreciate. For example, under the
9. See Part IV.C.2.a.ii.
10. In the legal literature, Stanislav Dolgopolov's work also views informed trading as a more general
phenomenon relevant to securities regulators, although his focus remains on insider trading. See Stanislav
Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Injormed Trading, and Market Making: Liquidity ofSecurities Markets in the Zero-
Sum Game, 3 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 1 (2012).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2011).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000).
14. See infra Parts V.C, V.F.
2018] 823
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misappropriation theory, a trade based on nonpublic information possessed by an entity
other than the issuer is legal if the entity has given the trader permission, but is, in general,
illegal if permission has not been granted.' 5 This distinction is criticized on both the left
and the right because the counterparty to the trade has the same regrets whether permission
was granted or not.16 Our analysis suggests that the real injury is reduced liquidity, which
is the same in either case. The legal distinction still makes sense, however, because trades
without permission undermine the incentives to acquire information that makes share
prices more accurate, whereas trades with permission enhance these incentives. In contrast,
New York's Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, has recently utilized New York's
Martin Act to launch a heated, but we believe misguided, public campaign against
institutions that release market-moving information early to a subset of traders, attacking
what he calls "Insider Trading 2.0."17
Also, under current law, a tippee's trade based on a tip from an insider within an issuer
is prohibited only if the tipper received a personal benefit.18 This result has been similarly
criticized because the counterparty to the tippee's trade is equally injured whether or not
the tipper enjoyed a personal benefit. 19 What constituted a personal benefit was at the
center of the dispute in U.S. v. Salman,20 a tippee case recently decided by the Supreme
Court. Again, our analysis suggests that the real social injury from the tippee's trade is
reduced liquidity, which is the same whether the tipper received a personal benefit or not.
Imposing liability on at least some tippees when the tipper received no personal benefit is
likely to chill analyst interviews, however. If trades based on information gleaned from
analyst interviews are outside Rule lOb-5's reach, some interviews will reveal material
non-public information that will be traded upon. This, viewed in isolation, is as unfortunate
as a trade based on the same information by an issuer insider. Not chilling analyst
interviews, however, also has a benefit: such interviews allow analysts to gather and
analyze pieces of immaterial non-public information that they can use to develop, and trade
on, a superior analysis of the value of the issuer's shares. The net social gain from the
second kind of trades is arguably greater than the net social loss from the first. 2 1
On the other hand, we find trading based on information relevant to a stock's value
that was made public so recently that it is not yet fully reflected in the price, though
perfectly legal today, reduces liquidity without any redeeming social benefit from its effect
15. See infra Part V.A.1.b.ii.
16. Compare Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245, 246-47 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing to uphold petitioner's Rule lOb-5 conviction "even if he had obtained the blessing of his employer's
principals"), with United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 680, 689-90 (1997) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (arguing
to reverse conviction because "in either case-disclosed misuse or authorized use .. . '[o]utsiders' would still be
trading based on nonpublic information that the average investor has no hope of obtaining").
17. See infra Part V.C.
18. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
19. See id. at 673 (Blackmun, J. dissent) ("The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach
does not eradicate the shareholder's injury.")
20. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
21. See infra Part V.A.2.d
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on price accuracy. This is because the information would be reflected in price very quickly
even without such trading.22 Moreover, significant resources are devoted to such trading.
Although it is probably impractical to try to make such trades illegal, they can be deterred
through appropriate rules governing the structure of trading markets. 23
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a basic understanding of how the
equity market works and uses this to show the general effects of informed trading. Part III
establishes our evaluative framework for assessing which kinds of informed trades are
socially desirable and which are socially undesirable. For those already familiar with our
recent work or the literature on trading markets more generally, Parts II and III may be
unnecessary. Part IV applies the evaluative framework to four types of informed trade to
determine which trades are socially desirable and which are not. Part V evaluates how well
existing regulations deter the undesirable kinds of informed trades and encourage the
desirable ones. Part VI concludes.
II. INFORMED TRADING's EFFECT ON LIQUIDITY AND SHARE PRICE ACCURACY
Seeing why informed trading improves share price accuracy and decreases liquidity
requires a basic understanding of how the equity market works.24 Accordingly, this Part
provides a quick survey of the different types of participants, the nature of trading venues
and the types of orders used on them, and how the market generates liquidity and the prices
at which stocks trade.
A. Market Participants and Their Reasons for Trading
There are four basic types of traders relevant to our analysis here: informed traders,
uninformed traders, noise traders, and anti-noise traders. The market also includes
professional suppliers of liquidity, who buy and sell securities to facilitate other traders'
transactions.
1. Informed Traders
Informed traders buy or sell a stock based on private information providing them with
a superior estimate of a stock's value25 than that implied by the stock's current price. This
information can arise from one of four sources.26
22. See infra Part IV.B.2.
23. See infra Part V.G.
24. Portions of this Part and significant aspects of Part Ill infra draw extensively on treatments in our prior
work. See Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 217-26 (2015)
[hereinafter The New Stock Market] (discussing the three different types of private information available); Merritt
B. Fox et al., Stock Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. REG. 67 (2018).
25. I.e., the expected future cash flows to a holder of the issuer's shares (discounted to present value). See
RICHARD BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 80-84 (11th ed. 2013).
26. This taxonomy owes much to Larry Harris's division of informed traders into value traders and news
traders, which inspires our fundamental value and announcement traders. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 194. While
we do not go as far as Harris to treat insider trading as a form of news or announcement trading, we share the
general view that their contribution to the social good of informative prices are similarly low. Id. at 228.
2018] 825
The Journal of Corporation Law
a. Fundamental Value Information
Fundamental value information arises from observing varied pieces of information
that are publicly available or involve observable features of the world and analyzing this
information in a sophisticated way that enables an assessment of a stock's value superior
to that implied by the current market price. Examples of fundamental value information
traders are actively managed mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, and the
professionally managed portfolios of wealthy individuals and non-profits.
b. Announcement Information
Announcement information is information contained in a public announcement with
obvious implications as to an issuer's future cash flows. It only retains its status as a basis
of informed trading for the brief period of time between the announcement and when the
information becomes fully reflected in price. Announcement traders profit by appreciating
with lightning speed the import of an announcement and then trading based on it with high
speed technology that enables their orders to rapidly reach trading venues.27
c. Information from Inside an Issuer
Much information held within an issuer is not yet public and reflected in price. Many
of the cases relating to informed trading arising under Rule 10b-5 involve trades based on
such information by corporate insiders or by their direct or indirect tippees. Such cases are
often referred to as reflecting the "classical theory" of how an informed trader can violate
Rule lOb-5. 28
d. Information from Inside a Non-issuer Source
Information relevant to predicting an issuer's future cash flows, which is not yet
public and reflected in price, is also frequently held within an institution other than the
issuer. This could be a company contemplating a takeover of the issuer, or one of the
potential acquirer's agents that is pledged to keep the takeover confidential, such as its law
firm or investment bank. Alternatively, it could instead be an institutional investor planning
the purchase or sale of a substantial number of shares. Or it could be a brokerage, research,
or media company that finds it commercially profitable to gather bits of publicly available
information, analyze them in a sophisticated way, and thereafter to sell and/or publicly
announce its conclusions. Rule lob-5 cases involving trades by insiders of such non-issuer
institutions done without permission, or by their direct or indirect tippees, are often referred
to as reflecting the misappropriation theory of how an informed trader can violate Rule
1Ob-5. 2 9
27. See Grace Xing Hu et al., Early Peek Advantage. Efficient Price Discovery With Tiered Information
Disclosure, 126 J. FIN. EcON. 399 (2017) (documenting the existence of traders who profit due to rapidly trading
on the release of market-moving information).
28. See infra Part V.A.l.b.i.
29. Id.
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2. Uninformed Traders
Uninformed traders trade stock without possessing information that allows a more
accurate appraisal of the stock's value than that implied by current market prices and
without a belief that they have such information or that prices are otherwise incorrect.
There are many possible motivations for uninformed trading. For instance, the purchase,
and later sale, of a share may be motivated by an individual's desire to save, i.e., to defer
consumption from the period of the purchase until the period of the later sale. 30 The
expected return when purchasing will simply be the expected return on the market as a
whole adjusted to reflect the risk characteristics of the particular firm's shares.31 Another
motivation for an uninformed trade is to adjust for the fact that, perhaps due to changing
conditions, the trader's current portfolio differs from the portfolio that would optimally
balance expected return against risk for her. 32
3. Noise and Anti-noise Traders
A noise trader believes she has information providing her with a more accurate
appraisal of a stock's value than what is reflected in the current price. What distinguishes
her from a fundamental value trader is that she in fact does not: her information is either
already reflected in the price or is irrelevant to it. Sometimes the beliefs driving each noise
trader during a given period will be idiosyncratic, in which case their buy and sell trades
will tend to cancel each other out. At other times, their beliefs may be part of a shared fad
or fashion, which will result in their trades pushing a stock's price in the direction suggested
by the fad or fashion. Their trading thus moves a stock's price away from being the best
estimate of its value in light of all currently available information.
An anti-noise trader actively searches for new information about an issuer's future
cash flows. When his search suggests there is no new information about an issuer, but the
price of its stock moves, the anti-noise trader will seek to profit by trading in the opposite
direction. The trades of such an anti-noise traders will thus, to one extent or another,
counteract the noise traders' effect on price and thus make prices more accurate than they
otherwise would be. Because of the obvious synergies between the information generation
needed to engage in fundamental value informed and the information search that is the
basis of anti-noise trading, the same person or institution will often engage in both
fundamental value informed trading and anti-noise trading.
4. Professional Liquidity Suppliers
A professional liquidity supplier's business is to stand ready to buy or sell shares at
30. Facilitating such consumption deferral is one of the social functions that a well-functioning securities
market can provide. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
31. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 302-08, 689.
32. Facilitating adjustments for risk related reasons is another social function that a well-functioning
securities market can provide. See supra Part Ill.B.2.b.
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its quoted prices (respectively a "bid" price to buy and an "offer" or "ask" price to sell).
For a given stock, the best available bid in the market is referred to as the national best bid
(NBB) and the best available offer as the national best offer (NBO). Today, liquidity
suppliers are typically high-frequency traders (HFTs). 33 HFTs employ high speed
communications to continuously update their information concerning transactions and
quotes at every trading venue and revise their own quotes accordingly. Professional
liquidity suppliers are typically not "informed" in the sense of fundamental value traders. 34
Indeed, because of their distinctive intermediary role facilitating trades as "market
makers," we will not refer to them as a "traders."
B. Trading Venues and Orders
Any given stock is potentially traded on each of a number of competing venues. Each
venue is typically an electronic limit order book, which consists of a "book" or queue of
limit orders posted by liquidity suppliers or traders. A limit order is a firm commitment,
binding until canceled, to buy or sell up to a specified number of shares at a quoted price.
The venue's computerized matching engine matches these posted limit orders with
incoming buy and sell market orders, which are orders directed to transact immediately
and unconditionally at whatever is the best available price in the market.
C. Informed Trading and the Economics ofLiquidity Provision
This Part explains why every type of informed trading reduces liquidity, while at the
same time improves price accuracy by moving prices so as to reflect relevant new
information. We will first consider a world with just informed traders, uninformed traders,
and liquidity suppliers. Then we will add in noise and anti-noise traders.
1. The Liquidity Supply Business
A liquidity supplier makes money, if on average, it sells a stock for more than it
purchased it.35 This might seem easy since a liquidity supplier's offer (the quote at which
it is willing to sell a stock) is always higher than its bid (the quote at which it is willing to
33. See Jonathan A. Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REv. FIN. STUD.
2267 (2013) (finding based on NASDAQ data set that HFTs supply liquidity for over 40% of all trades and
provide the market quotes 40% of the time); see generally Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the
New-Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. MRKTS. 712 (2013).
34. The limited exception is that HFTs may seek to protect themselves from announcement traders by trying
to monitor announcements relevant to the stocks in which they make a market.
35. As used here, "makes money" means that the revenues that it generates from its sales at the offer exceed
its expenditures from its purchases at the bid. A more complete model of how the bid-ask spread is set would
include a consideration of the costs of operations, compensation for the utility decreasing risks to its principals of
having a not fully diversified portfolio concentrated in particular securities, and the need for capital, all features
of the real world. Breaking even in the long run requires a spread wide enough to cover these costs as well and to
provide a normal market return on capital. There is in fact empirical evidence that the adverse selection factors
being discussed here account for a majority of the spread between the bid and the ask in most markets. See
HARRIS, supra note 1, at 158.
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buy the same stock). The problem, however, is that some traders are informed. Because the
stock market is anonymous, a liquidity supplier generally does not know the identity of her
counterparty or what, if anything, that person knows. Thus, liquidity suppliers sometimes
trade with the informed. As we will now explain, liquidity suppliers lose money when they
trade with informed traders.
2. Transacting with Injormed Versus Uninformed Traders
The essential reason liquidity suppliers lose money when trading with the informed is
that informed traders only trade when they have a superior assessment of a stock's value
than what the current market price implies. Thus, all traders who trade with informed
traders lose money. The informed trader only buys when her superior assessment of a
stock's value suggests that the value is above the counterparty's offer, and only sells when
her superior assessment suggests that the value is below the liquidity provider's bid. Thus,
in transactions with an informed trader, the liquidity supplier sells at prices that the
informed trader's information suggests is below the value of the stock, and buys at prices
that the informed trader's information suggests is above the value of the stock. These, on
average, will be losing transactions for the liquidity supplier. In essence, the liquidity
supplier faces a classic adverse selection situation. 36
On the other hand, the liquidity supplier makes money from its transactions with
uninformed traders. On average, these transactions should be profitable because the
assessment of value of the stock implied by current market prices is the mid-point between
the NBO and NBB. Thus, when a liquidity supplier buys from an uninformed trader at the
NBB, and sells to an uninformed trader at the NBO, each of these transactions on average
yields an expected profit equal to half the spread between the two quotes. Thus, the
liquidity supplier on average buys for a little less than value and sells for a little more than
value.
To sum up, liquidity suppliers lose money when they buy at the bid from informed
sellers or sell at the offer to informed buyers. They can still break even, however, as long
as there are enough uninformed traders willing, in order to accomplish their reasons for
trading, to suffer the expected trading loss of buying at the offer and selling at the bid. Put
otherwise, the spread between the bid and offer must be sufficiently large that the liquidity
supplier's profits from trading with uninformed traders offset its losses from trading with
informed traders.
3. The Liquidity Impact of an Anticipated Level ofInformed Trading
A liquidity supplier cannot simply set an extremely wide spread to garner large profits.
Liquidity suppliers function in a competitive market. As a result, to survive, they must set
36. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (analyzing how informational asymmetries can drive declines in the quality
of goods traded in a market until only "lemons" are left). Liquidity suppliers face the constant threat that they are
trading under conditions of information asymmetry and are thus transacting when the trade is adverse to their
interests.
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their quotes aggressively enough (offers low enough and bids high enough offers) to attract
counterparties to trade, but still earn sufficient revenue that their profits from trading with
the uninformed equal or exceed their losses from trading with the informed. If the level of
expected informed trading increases, liquidity suppliers must set their offers higher, and
bids lower, to break even.
This is true at the level of every bid and offer a liquidity supplier posts. The liquidity
supplier knows there is some probability that every incoming order that transacts against
its quotes is uninformed as well as a probability that it is informed. It also knows with
certitude that if the next marketable order to arrive is a buy, that it may be motivated by
private information that his offer is too low and no chance it is motivated by private
information his offer is too high (and vice versa with sell orders). Thus, a rational liquidity
supplier anticipates that whichever kind of order arrives next will alter its estimate of the
stock's value due to this informational signal-up if the order is a buy because there is
some chance that order arrived from an informed trader, and thus, that there is positive
information not reflected in price, and down if it is a sell, for the same reason.
Of course, the liquidity supplier sets its bid and offer before knowing whether the next
order will be a buy or sell. Nonetheless, when deciding on its offer, it knows that an
informed trader will only submit a buy order to transact with that offer if in possession of
positive private information suggesting the current price is too low. The liquidity supplier
thus knows the arrival of a buy order will move its estimate of the stock's value upward
due to the probability that the order was motivated by positive private information. To not
regret that transaction, the liquidity supplier must, before the order arrives, set its offer
quote to reflect that upward revision accompanying the buy order's arrival. Likewise, when
the supplier sets its bid, to be regret free, the bid must reflect the anticipated downward
revision accompanying the arrival of a sell order. The result is that bids and offers are
already set at prices contingent on the next arriving order being, respectively, a buy order
or a sell order. If a liquidity supplier expects a higher percentage of incoming orders to be
informed, then these revisions of estimated value (upward or downward depending on
which kind of order arrives next) will be greater. In other words, its offers will be higher
above the midpoint and its bid lower than the midpoint. 37
As a result, the more informed trading that liquidity suppliers anticipate, the less liquid
the market. Liquidity is a complex concept addressing the ease of trade, which includes the
size of a trade, the price at which it executes, and the time execution takes. Generally, the
larger a trade, and the faster the desired execution, the less attractive the price. The greater
a market's liquidity, however, the less severe are these tradeoffs. If liquidity suppliers
expect that a higher percentage of orders will be informed, their best bids will need to be
lower and their best offers higher. Otherwise, they will not survive in business and will not
be making quotes in a rational, profit-maximizing way given the implications of whether
the next order is a buy or sell. The same is true of its bids and offers away from its best bid
and offer and their associated quantities, and so its book will have less depth.
37. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market
with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985) (modeling trading behavior under
information asymmetries in securities markets).
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4. The Pattern of Transaction Prices in the Presence of Informed Trading
How rational liquidity suppliers set their quotes in a market with informed traders
produces an important side-effect. As just described, liquidity suppliers constantly update
quotes in response to transactions. As a result, the market price eventually comes to fully
reflect informed traders' information. In essence, liquidity providers' quoting behavior
reflects a kind of "invisible hand" simply due to their efforts to minimize losses to informed
traders.
To illustrate, consider an informed trader with a piece of positive private information
that motivates him to send in buy orders. At the same time, uninformed traders are also
trading, and the number of their buy and sell orders are approximately equal because the
reasons they trade are unrelated to efforts to accrue trading profits by finding over- or
under-priced securities. So, during this period, both buy and sell orders will arrive at trading
venues, but in total there will be more buys than sells because the incoming buy orders also
include orders from informed traders. Accordingly, the bids and offers liquidity suppliers
set fluctuate as their estimate of value moves slightly up and down with the arrival of each
buy and sell order. Ultimately, though, the predominance of buy orders will cause the
revised quotes to trend up, along with the mid-point between the bid and offer, until the
offer gets high enough that it equals the informed traders' estimate of the share's value.38
These adverse selection models are strongly supported by empirical analyses, which show
that intra-day changes in quotes and transaction prices respond to the pattern of buy and
sell orders, and that the adjustment in price described above often occurs rapidly. 39
In sum, informed trading makes stock prices more accurate. As described above,
liquidity suppliers' quotes-the prices posted on trading venues-adjust in response to
private information. Because private information allows for a more accurate appraisal of
the stock's value than that implied by its current price, the effect of liquidity suppliers'
revisions is to cause the bid and offer to move in the direction of a more accurate appraisal
until they fully reflect all the private information on which others trade. 40
5. Adding in the Effects of Noise Traders and Anti-Noise Traders
Noise traders believe they have information that permits a more accurate appraisal of
an issuer's value, but that information either is already reflected in price or is irrelevant to
developing a more accurate appraisal. To the extent that what drives noise traders at any
38. More accurately, the price will be within half of the bid-ask spread from fully reflecting the information.
39. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components ofthe Bid/Ask Spread, 21
J. FIN. EcoN. 123 (1988); Kalok Chan et al., The Intraday Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks and
CBOE Options, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 329 (1995).
40. This discussion leaves out what Professors Gilson and Kraakman refer to as "derivatively informed
traders." See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 572 (1984). These price decoders are active speculative traders who have no private information allowing a
better prediction of the future cash flows of an issuer. Instead, they observe trends in bids, offers, and executed
transactions to try to detect informed trading by others and seek to profit by trading in the same direction. Price
decoders simply amplify the effects on the market of any particular kind of informed trading, whether socially
good or bad.
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one moment of time is idiosyncratic to each trader, their buy and sell trades tend to cancel
each other out. Just like uninformed trading, such idiosyncratic noise trading creates no
significant order imbalance for liquidity suppliers, and thus, has no significant effect on
price or the bid/ask spread. To the extent, however, that a widely shared but foundationless
belief drives the noise trading, an order imbalance will result. The imbalance pushes bids
and offers in the direction suggested by the fad or fashion and makes the midpoint deviate
from what would otherwise be the best estimate of an issuer's future cash flow, given all
publicly available information.
Anti-noise traders actively search for new information about an issuer's future cash
flows. They transact when they infer the presence of noise trading because prices have
moved, but they see no new information to justify this movement. To illustrate how the
anti-noise trader's reaction to fad-driven noise trading works, start with a situation where
there is no informed trading and no noise in an issuer's shares so that the initial midpoint
between the bid and the offer represents the best estimate of the stock's value given
available information. Noise traders then acquire a widely shared but false belief that the
stock's value is significantly below this initial midpoint and start selling, which creates an
imbalance of sell orders reaching the liquidity suppliers and pushes down the bid and the
offer. They continue this selling until the bid drops to what they (incorrectly) believe to be
the stock's value. The anti-noise traders, observing this price drop and finding no genuinely
predictive negative information to justify it, start buying. This creates an imbalance of buy
orders reaching the liquidity suppliers and pushes up the bid and the offer. They continue
this selling until the offer reaches the initial midpoint.
As this story illustrates, noise traders who incorrectly believe they possess negative
information suffer trading losses because they sell shares for less than they are worth. Anti-
noise traders enjoy trading gains because they buy shares for less than they are worth. In
the end, liquidity suppliers on average just make the spread on each share purchased from
the noise traders and then sold to the anti-noise traders. This is because the midpoint
between the bid and the offer is commensurably below the value of the shares, both as the
shares are purchased from the noise traders and as they are sold to the anti-noise traders,
but the purchases are at the bid and the sales at the offer. Thus, the combination of fad-
driven noise trading and anti-noise trading does not worsen the liquidity suppliers' adverse
selection problem. The mirror image of this story occurs when the noise traders incorrectly
believe they have positive information, and again, the liquidity suppliers' adverse selection
problem is not worsened.
III. THE EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK
Evaluating whether a given kind of informed trading is socially desirable requires
reference to the basic functions served by equity trading markets. It also requires
recognition that other market participants adjust their behavior in response to the extent of
this trading. Thus, the central normative question is how the existence of any type of
informed trading affects the entire trading system in terms of its ultimate capacity to further
the multiple goals that society expects the stock market to serve. These goals also justify
regulation when the markets fall short.
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A. Goals
Five basic social goals animate most discussion of secondary equity markets41 and
their regulation: (1) promoting the efficient allocation of capital to the best new investment
projects in the economy; (2) promoting the efficient operation of the economy's existing
productive capacity; (3) promoting the efficient allocation of resources between current
and future periods so as to best satisfy the needs of firms seeking financing for real
investments, and the needs of savers seeking to forgo current consumption in order to enjoy
future consumption; (4) promoting the efficient allocation among investors of the risks
associated with holding securities so that risk-averse investors bear their volatility with
minimal disutility; and (5) operating fairly and fostering an overall sense of fairness. In
addition, any intelligent discussion of the desirability of any given type of informed trading
and its regulation must take into account the impact of the trading on the real resources that
society devotes to trading in and operating equity markets, and to the enforcement and
compliance costs associated with their regulation.
B. Market Attributes that Impact These Goals
A given trading practice, including any type of informed trading, impacts these five
broad social goals through its effect on how the trading market functions. How well the
market functions can be described largely in terms of its two most important characteristics:'
price accuracy and liquidity.42 As a result, the social impact of any given type of informed
trading is best evaluated through a two-step process; first assessing the effect of that trading
on each of these two market attributes and then identifying those attributes' effects on each
of the five goals. As we have seen in Part I, every type of informed trading has a positive
impact on price accuracy and a negative impact on liquidity. But, the ratio of these two
impacts and the duration of the price accuracy improvement vary greatly from one type to
another. Consequently, some types of informed trading are socially desirable and others,
are socially undesirable, the subject of Part III. Before turning to this analysis, however, it
is worth briefly considering what price accuracy and liquidity are and how they affect the
five social goals above.
1. Price Accuracy
Price accuracy concerns how well the trading price of an issuer 's shares predicts its
future cash flows. Accurate secondary market prices have a number of desirable effects.
First, the market price largely determines the price of a new offering by a public issuer and
41. In the primary market, stocks are purchased from the company issuing those stocks, while in the
secondary market, traders buy and sell stocks from each other. Stock exchanges are fundamentally secondary
markets.
42. THIERRY FOUCAULT ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 31 (2013)
(describing price accuracy and liquidity as the two most important attributes of a securities market and the social
role that each plays).
2018] 833
The Journal of Corporation Law
thus helps steer society 's scarce capital to the economy 's most promising new real
investment projects. 43 Share price also influences, with similar effect, the availability of
new project funding from other outside sources and the willingness of managers to use
internal funds for investment.44
More accurate share prices also help reveal to corporate boards and shareholders those
managers who are performing poorly in deploying internal funds for new investment
projects (again promoting the efficient allocation of capital), and in directing the use of the
issuer's current assets (assisting the efficient operation of the economy's existing
productive capacity). 45 They improve as well the effectiveness of share-price-based
compensation schemes and the threats of hostile takeovers and activist hedge fund
pressures as incentives for better managerial decision-making in these regards. 46
More accurate share prices today also likely lead over time to a greater investor sense
of fairness because they will experience fewer large negative surprises. 47
2. Liquidity
Liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept that involves the size of a trade, the price at
which it is executed, and the time execution takes, with the spread between the NBB and
NBO and the depth of liquidity suppliers' books being good measures. 4 8 Liquidity has an
impact on a number of social goals:
a. More Efficient Allocation ofResources over Time
The prospect of greater liquidity promotes more efficient allocation of society 's
currently available scarce resources so that they result in the most efficient pattern of
consumption across time.
Consider first an enterprise issuing new stock to obtain funds for a real investment
project. It seeks to purchase current dollars in return for the promise of future dollars in the
form of dividends or other distributions. The more liquid are an issuer's shares, the more
valuable its shares are to hold for any given level of expected future cash flow. Thus, when
43. See, e.g., Qi Chen et al., Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price, 20 REV. FIN.
STUD. 619 (2007) (showing that investment decisions tend to increase when a stock's price has just risen).
44. Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 260-64 (2009).
45. Id. at 258-60.
46. Id. Extensive empirical evidence suggests that accurate price signals have efficiency-enhancing effects
on managerial decisions, see FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 42, at 361-68 (collecting relevant empirical studies).
See generally Philip Bond et al., The Real Effects of Financial Markets, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 339 (2012).
47. In an efficient market, the market price, whether it is relatively accurate or inaccurate, is an unbiased
predictor of an issuer's future cash flows. An inaccurate price is just more likely to be far off, one way or the
other, from how things ultimately turn out. When a large negative surprise materializes, however, its salience
likely generates a sense of grievance even though, ex ante, a large positive surprise was as likely. See, e.g.,
DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK 11 (2016) (discussing how emotions drive investing
decisions).
48. See supra Part I.C.
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issuers offer shares in the primary market, shares anticipated to be more liquid will obtain,
all else equal, a higher sale price. Hence, the lower will be the issuer's cost of capital.49
On the other side of this transaction are savers, who seek a future return in exchange
for providing current savings. Illiquidity, like a tax, results in a "wedge" between the value
of what the savers expect to receive in the future and the value of what the entrepreneurs
or issuers expect to give up in the future. 50 This wedge prevents certain transactions from
occurring that would have occurred if the shares were expected to be more liquid. These
are transactions into which the issuer and savers would have willingly entered and that
would have made both parties better off on an expected basis. Improved liquidity reduces
these lost gains and hence increases social welfare. 51
b. More Efficient Allocation ofRisk
Liquidity also promotes the efficient allocation of risk. For every investor, there is an
optimal portfolio specifying what proportion of her wealth should be invested in risky
securities and, within that part of the portfolio, what percentage should be invested in each
available risky security. For a variety of reasons, what constitutes an investor's optimal
portfolio frequently changes. By reducing the transaction costs associated with transacting,
greater liquidity allows individual investors to cost-effectively adjust their portfolios over
time to keep it closer to what is optimal.
c. Greater Share Price Accuracy
Liquidity also lowers the transaction costs associated with speculative trading based
on acquiring fundamental value information. As a result, liquidity promotes such activities
and thus increases share price accuracy with its attendant benefits.
IV. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF INFORMED TRADING
As demonstrated in Part I, all informed trading increases price accuracy, which is
socially good, and decreases liquidity, which is socially bad. How do these effects net out
with respect to particular types of informed trading, however? This Part considers this
question with respect to four types of informed trading. Fundamental value informed
trading is found to be socially desirable. Announcement trading is found to be undesirable.
Trading on the basis of information from inside an issuer is found to be generally
49. The prospect of a smaller bid/ask spread means the same issuer's expected future cash flows will be
discounted to present value at a lower discount rate, reducing that issuer's cost of capital. See generally Yakov
Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1986) [hereinafter
Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing] (showing returns on NYSE stock increase with their bid-ask spreads);
Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices: Financial Management Implications, 17 FIN.
MGMT. 5 (1988) (studying techniques to balance benefits and costs of increasing liquidity).
50. See FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 42, at 361-68 (analyzing how illiquidity functions as a wedge
separating transaction prices from assets' fundamental values).
51. In other words, savers save less, and entrepreneurs and issuers engage in less real investment than the
levels that would be mutually more advantageous but for the savers' concerns about the liquidity of the issuers'
shares. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 214-15.
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undesirable, but with exceptions-for example, trading on the basis of an evaluation of the
company based on a variety of small bits of nonpublic information as opposed to being
based on one major piece of information about to be announced. The desirability of trading
based on information from inside a non-issuer institution depends on whether the
institution agrees to its use. Where it does, allowing such trading further incentivizes the
institution to generate valuable information and, hence, is socially desirable. Where the
institution does not agree, the opposite is the case.
A. Fundamental Value Informed Trading
Fundamental value information arises from a person gathering bits of publicly
available information and observations of the world and analyzing what the person has
gathered or observed in a sophisticated way that allows a superior assessment of these cash
flows than is implied by current market pricing. Hedge funds and actively managed mutual
funds, pension funds, and endowments of non-profits are examples of informed traders
using such information.
In determining the social value of such trading, we start with an analysis of its wealth
impacts, from both an ex-post and ex-ante perspective. The ex-post perspective relates to
who is better off, and who is worse off, after a single such informed trade. The ex-ante
perspective relates to the effect on the expected wealth positions of the different market
participants when such trading occurs as an ongoing practice within a competitive
environment. These analyses allow us to make determinations about the fairness of the
practice and the incentives that it creates. We consider as well the extent and duration of
price accuracy improvement associated with the practice relative to its negative impact on
liquidity, and the resources its practitioners consume that would otherwise be available for
other socially useful purposes.
Our ultimate conclusion is that fundamental value informed trading is fair and
enhances the efficiency of the U.S. economy. Thus, it is socially desirable. The conclusion
is not really very controversial: few have suggested that those who, through their own hard
work and using publicly available sources, come up with superior assessments of an
issuer's share value should be prohibited from trading on this information to their profit.52
The way we come to this conclusion, however, sharpens the analysis considerably and
provides a roadmap for analyzing the other, more controversial forms of informed trading.
52. A number of commentators have called for a "parity of information" approach to regulating insider
trading, whereby all trades where one party is better informed would be illegal because of the unfairness imposed
on other party. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic
Information, 73 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1090 (1985); see generally Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty Free Insider
Trading, 2013 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 369 (2013); Louis Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by
Corporate "Insiders" in the United States, 3 MOD. L. REV. 34 (1970); Schotland, supra note 2. Some have also
suggested that this is the predominant approach in Europe. See 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES
FRAUD § 6:131 (2d ed. 1997) (describing "parity of information" as the "foundation" of E.U. insider trading
laws). While the logic of this approach easily extends to trades based on private fundamental value information,
these commentators, if pressed would probably not view their comments as applying to such trades. For a
discussion of the actual European approach, see also infra Part V.D.1.
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1. Wealth Effiects: The Ex-Post Perspective Through an Example
Understanding the wealth transfer implications of fundamental value informed trading
is most easily understood by starting with an example. Suppose X does substantial research,
gathering various bits of publicly available information about the potential sales for
automobiles operating on pure ethanol obtained from switchgrass and about the economic
practicality of this process. ABC is known to be the auto firm furthest along in developing
an engine that can burn this fuel. X concludes that the switchgrass process is more practical,
and consumer interest greater, than is generally believed. ABC's NBB is $59.95 and NBO
was $60.05 and X's research suggests the stock is worth $70.00. X starts using a large
number of small market buy orders, averaging in aggregate 10,000 shares per day. For
expository simplicity, assume that during X's buying period, X is the only informed trader
of any kind, there is no noise or anti-noise trading, and there is no publicly released
information relevant to the value of ABC's share. So if X had not been buying, the NBB
and NBO would have remained at about their initial levels.
X continues his buying until, given the continued imbalance of buy orders over sell
orders received by liquidity suppliers, the NBB has risen to $69.90 and the NBO to $70.00.
By this point X has been buying for 100 trading days and has acquired 1,000,000 ABC
shares at an average price of $65.05. At this point, X gives his research to a prominent
business journalist, who checks it out and writes an article in a widely-read business
magazine based on X's research, at which point ABC's NBB inches up to $69.95 and NBO
to $70.05.5 3 Who gained and who lost in this story?
a. Informed Traders
X, the informed trader appears to have a trading gain of slightly less than $5 million,
the difference between the average purchase price and what he can sell them for after the
announcement. Since trading is a zero-sum game, the gains and losses of all the other
players in the market must aggregate to a loss of the same amount.
b. Liquidity Suppliers
The liquidity suppliers would, over the 100 trading day period, have received and
executed against their quotes 1,000,000 more buy orders than sell orders: X would have
submitted 1,000,000 buy orders and no sell orders; the uninformed traders, because they
trade for reasons unrelated to making trading profits, would in aggregate have submitted
an approximately equal number of buy and sell orders. 54 Thus, the liquidity suppliers
would be short by 1,000,000 shares at the time the announcement of the engine
53. This example has the informed trader ultimately making public the information she generated in order
to lock in her profit. This not a necessary step for profiting from informed trading, however. The informed trader
instead might wait to sell until the event predicted by the information occurs or the prospect of it occurring
becomes obvious to the public based on other news.
54. See infra Part IL.C.4.
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development is made.
The liquidity supplier makes on average $.05 (half the spread) for each purchase from,
and for each sale to, an uninformed trader, but that would have happened anyway even if
X had not traded. So, as a result of X's purchases, the liquidity traders sold, for an average
of $65.05, 1,000,000 shares that are now implicitly valued by the market at $70.00, i.e., the
liquidity traders' short positions translate into a loss equal to the same approximate $5
million gain enjoyed by X. 55
c. Uninformed Traders
Because the uninformed buy and sell orders each day are essentially equal in number,
the gradual increase in the bid and offer during the period of X's trading will be a wash for
uninformed traders as a group. Compared to if X had not placed his orders, however, sellers
are better off and buyers are worse off, with the gains for sellers just equaling the losses of
55. Adverse selection models of liquidity supply of the kind described in supra. Part II.C do not address
how liquidity suppliers reverse the inventory effects of executing on the order imbalance caused by informed
trade, nor the price impact when informed traders lock in their profits by reverse transactions once their private
information becomes public. In terms of the account in the text, the simplest story is as follows. By the time of
that the information becomes public, X's portfolio has about a million ABC shares more than a fully diversified
portfolio and the portfolios of the liquidity supplier, relative to fully diversified ones, in aggregate are short about
1,000,000 shares short in ABC shares. In each case, this position means that the portfolio has a large amount of
extra, firm specific, risk that can be eliminated by full diversification without any sacrifice in expected return. See
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 302-08, 689. This is something they would wish to do. Thus, X would be
anxious to sell, and the liquidity suppliers would be anxious to buy, this amount of shares and the transactions to
accomplish this should occur at about $70.00 per share. To the extent that the sales by X nevertheless began to
push the bid down much below this figure, anti-noise traders, believing there is no private information, would
submit buy orders.
A more complicated story would recognize that liquidity suppliers would likely seek to rebalance their
portfolios regularly and would not wait until the informed trading stopped. Using the example again, one could
imagine that after each day's 10,000 share order imbalance, liquidity suppliers would have a somewhat lower bid
and higher offer than what would be called for by the pure adverse selection considerations described in supra
Part 11.C. The object would be to find some price sensitive investors who would respond by sending in more sell
orders and fewer buy orders than would otherwise have been the case. These investors are different from any of
the market participants described in supra Part II.A. Each of these investors has its own reservation price for
buying and for selling ABC shares that is a product of its own best estimate of ABC's future cash flows based on
its particular analysis of publicly available information, how long or short it already is in ABC shares, and a
discount to reflect the chance that what appears to be an attractive purchase or sale price might be the result of
informed trading. See MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE: THEORY, PRACTICE AND
POLICY, 34-43, 55-57 (1988) [hereinafter Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE]. Inventory models in
microstructure economics have developed a sophisticated literature in this vein. See, e.g., Mark
B. Garman, Market Microstructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 265 (1976); Thomas S.Y. Ho & Hans R.
Stoll, Optimal Dealer Pricing Under Transactions and Return Uncertainty, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 47 (1981); Hans R.
Stoll, The Supply ofDealer Services in Securities Markets, 33 J. Fin. 1133 (1978); Amihud & Mendelson, Asset
Pricing, supra note 49, at 223-24. Because these trades are not motivated by either new private information, like
those of fundamental value informed traders, or on a search suggesting that a price change is not due to new
private information, like those of anti-noise traders, they otherwise act more like uninformed traders and are thus
not considered as an additional kind of trader in the analysis in the text.
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buyers.
2. Wealth and Resource Allocation Effects: The Ex-ante Perspective
The ex-ante perspective compares, in long run competitive equilibrium, a world where
the practice of fundamental value informed trading occurs freely versus one where it does
not and considers the differences in terms of the wealth positions of the market's various
participants and in terms of the allocation of resources. It assumes, not unrealistically, that
all the participants have unbiased (though not necessarily accurate) expectations
concerning the prevalence of informed trading by fundamental informed traders.
a. Fundamental Value Informed Traders
Fundamental value informed trading will generate positive trading profits on an
expected basis, as illustrated above, even though the existence of the practice widens the
spreads that its practitioners incur. The business of such trading requires skilled and
unskilled labor and physical, organizational, and financial assets. 56
In a competitive economy, suppliers of the ordinary inputs will be paid a market return
comparable to what they would earn if the resources they supplied were deployed instead
another way. So, the practice of fundamental value informed trading has no effect on their
wealth positions. The persons with uniquely useful abilities and skills for fundamental
value trading will be paid greater rents than they would be paid if they had to work in a
different business. So, the wealth positions of these persons are greater in the world where
the practice occurs freely than where it is prohibited.
b. Liquidity Suppliers
As shown in Part II, liquidity suppliers will incur expected trading losses when they
transact with informed traders. At the same time, liquidity suppliers gain in their
transactions with uninformed traders, making on average half the spread with each
purchase or sale. To survive in a competitive market, a liquidity supplier must set its bids
and offers so that these losses and gains balance out, plus cover the returns paid to its
personnel, a market return on the capital needed for real estate and equipment and for
engaging in the trading itself, and compensation for the undiversified nature of the portfolio
that the business will be holding much of the time. With spreads wider than this, the
liquidity supplier will not attract orders. With spreads narrower than this, at least some of
the liquidity supplier's inputs will be receiving less than a market return and thus the
56. Some of these inputs are ordinary in the sense that they could equally usefully be deployed elsewhere
in the economy. Other inputs are specialized, specifically the efforts of key persons who possess abilities and
skills uniquely useful for generating new fundamental value information. All of these inputs will be drawn into
this business up to the point where, at the margin, the expected trading profits from successfully generating and
trading on fundamental value information equals the costs of paying for the inputs.
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supplier will not be able to survive in the long run. 57
Despite the fact that the trading losses suffered by liquidity suppliers because of the
free occurrence of fundamental value informed trading are passed onto traders in the form
of wider spreads, the practice does have a negative effect on the wealth positions of certain
persons associated with the liquidity supply business. This is because the practice widens
the spread between bid and offer, thereby increasing the cost of trading. When trading costs
more, less of it occurs. This means that there is less demand for the services of liquidity
suppliers. 58
c. Anti-noise Traders
Anti-noise traders buy at the offer and sell at the bid. To the extent that fundamental
value informed trading widens the spread, it increases the anti-noise traders' costs of doing
business, making it less profitable. This decreases the resources drawn into it, thereby
reducing the rents paid to its specialized inputs. These points are softened, though, by the
fact that there are synergies for a person or entity to engage in the fundamental value
informed trade business and the anti-noise trading business at the same time.
d Uninformed Traders: Actual Costs and Their Ultimate Incidence
Because an uninformed trader buys at the offer and sells at the bid, she pays the spread
between the two in the full cycle of the purchase and sale of a share. Freely occurring
fundamental value trading makes this spread larger and so this cost of trading will be
greater for her. However, determining the ultimate incidence of this cost on the wealth of
the market participants involved is complicated. When an issuer's entrepreneurs and early
investors engage in an initial public offering, the shares offered will be discounted to reflect
the anticipated spread paid with each subsequent sale and purchase in the secondary
market. 59 The wider spread from freely occurring fundamental value informed trading
reduces what the entrepreneurs and early investors receive selling shares when they take
their firms public. This discount continues at the same level for as long as the firm appears
to have a long run future.
57. Recall that in Part It we adopted a simplified analysis that abstracts away from all the costs of being a
liquidity supplier except the "adverse selection" component of the spread, i.e., the portion of the spread by which
trading gains from transacting with uninformed investors compensate for the trading losses from transacting with
informed traders. See Glosten & Harris, supra note 39.
58. Like fundamental value informed trading, liquidity supply requires both ordinary and specialized
inputs. Lower demand will mean less of both of these kinds of resources will be pulled into the business. Again,
suppliers of the ordinary inputs will earn the same ordinary market return whatever the level of liquidity supply
activity, and so their wealth positions are unaffected. Persons with abilities and skills uniquely useful for liquidity
supply will be paid less in rents and so their wealth positions would be negatively affected.
59. The idea that shares' trading prices are discounted based on anticipated costs of trade has now been
familiar for decades. For early examples from the insider trading context, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production ofInformation, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 325
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Insider Trading]; Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule IOb-5, Disclosure, and
Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 807-09 (1980).
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e. Uninformed Traders: Illusory Losses and Gains
A number of other uninformed trader losses and gains appear to be associated with
fundamental value informed trading, but, upon closer analysis, prove to be illusory. An
uninformed seller may sometimes regret a sale that occurs at a time when, unknown to her,
an informed trader is making purchases. But, because the uninformed trader's motivations
for trading are not prompted by either new information or price change, she would have
sold anyway even if the informed trader had not traded. So, the regret is not properly related
to the informed trader's purchases.
Indeed, as the example above illustrates, the informed trader's purchases, by pushing
up the bids and offers quoted by liquidity suppliers, mean that the uninformed seller will
receive more for her shares than if the informed trader had not been purchasing. From an
ex-ante point of view, however, this gain is also illusory: the uninformed trader was just as
likely to be a buyer as a seller when the price has been pushed up in this way and so the
practice on an ongoing basis is as likely to hurt her as help her. A parallel set of illusions
would accompany an uninformed trader's purchase when an informed trader is selling.
3. Fairness Analysis
Overall, it is hard to argue that fundamental value informed trading creates unfairness.
Liquidity suppliers will suffer trading losses, as illustrated in the ex-post example. The ex-
ante analysis, however, shows these losses simply to be a cost of doing business that is
passed onto traders through wider spreads. The ex-post example shows that uninformed
traders trading in the same direction as the informed trader are worse off. For example,
when an informed trader is buying, he pushes prices up, thereby increasing what
uninformed buyers need to pay. But, the informed trading makes uninformed traders
trading in the opposite direction (in this example, the sellers) better off by an equal amount.
So, the practice is as likely to help as hurt an uninformed trader as she enters into any given
transaction. Given this, a loss in any one transaction is likely to be canceled out by a gain
in some other transaction, particularly if the investor ameliorates this risk, along with the
myriad of other risks in equity investing, by holding a diversified portfolio.
Freely occurring fundamental value informed trading does widen the spread that
uninformed traders need to pay. However, this widened spread, as we have seen, neither
helps nor hurts uninformed traders on average because share prices are commensurately
discounted to reflect this widened spread. Thus, the cost of this widened spread ultimately
falls on entrepreneurs and early investors that face a higher cost of capital because of this
discount. These same entrepreneurs and early investors benefit, however, from the
practice's resulting improved price accuracy, which, as we will discuss, lowers the cost of
capital.
The ex-ante analysis shows that freely allowing fundamental value trading draws
resources into this business, thereby improving the wealth positions of the suppliers of its
specialized inputs.And it diminishes resources drawn into the liquidity supply and anti-
noise trading businesses, thereby decreasing the wealth positions of their specialized input
suppliers. In a market economy, however, the offer of rents prompt the suppliers of
specialized inputs to come forward and is the mechanism by which these resources get
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directed to the activity for. which they are most particularly suited. Thus, the practice's
positive or negative effects on the rents being paid in these three businesses do not appear
to raise any greater fairness issues than do the rents paid by persons with special abilities
and skills across the whole market-based part of our economy.60
4. Efficiency Considerations
The foregoing discussion suggests that the more serious normative question raised by
fundamental value informed trading is whether the practice increases or decreases
economic efficiency, not whether those who suffer losses as a result of such a trade have
experienced unfairness. Indeed, because the analysis of the wealth impacts of the other
three types of informed traders will follow lines similar to the analysis here, we will
conclude that with them also, efficiency, not fairness, should be the prime normative
concern.
Freely occurring fundamental value trading positively affects economic welfare by
increasing share price accuracy. It negatively affects economic welfare by reducing
liquidity and by consuming resources that would otherwise be available for the production
of other goods and services of value to society. We discuss these effects and their balance
below.
a. Positive Effects on Price Accuracy
Trading by any type of informed trader moves prices in the direction of what they
would be if the trader's information was fully reflected in price. As a consequence, all
kinds of informed trading make prices more accurate. The distinguishing feature of
fundamental value informed trading is that, unlike the other three kinds of informed
trading, the information on which it is based did not exist before it was generated as the
result of the trader's own actions. This distinguishing feature has two important
implications discussed immediately below. These implications, in turn, suggest that,
relative to other types of informed trading, fundamental informed trading's effect on price
accuracy has a much larger positive impact on the functioning of the real economy and its
capacity to provide society with goods and services.
i. Trading Profits Create Incentives to Produce New Information
With fundamental value informed trading, the prospect of trading profits creates an
incentive to increase the stock of information in the world relevant to predicting an issuer's
60. Nonetheless, there is an active and notable debate as to whether the size of the financial intermediation
industry is excessive and whether wages are being competitively set within it. See generally Thomas Philippon,
Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408 (2015) (assessing the efficiency
dynamics of financial services over time); Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the
U.S. Financial Industry: 1909-2006, 127 Q. J. EcoN. (2012).
61. Informed trading by definition is based on information that allows a more accurate appraisal of the
stock's value than the assessment of value of the stock implied by current market prices. So, when prices move
in the direction of reflecting this information, they become more accurate.
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long-term future cash flows. This is not the case with the other three kinds of informed
trading.
ii. Price Accuracy is Improved Over a Longer Span of Time
Price accuracy relates to the accuracy with which the market price of an issuer's shares
predicts the events that determine an issuer's future cash flows. Compared to the
information that is the basis of other types of informed trading, the information motivating
fundamental value informed trading is more likely to relate to the probability of an event
in the medium or long-term future.
To illustrate, consider the ex-post example above. X does substantial research,
gathering various bits of publicly available information about the potential sales for
automobiles operating on pure ethanol obtained from switchgrass and on the practicality
of the process. Using smart analysis, he concludes that they are better than generally
believed. He therefore purchases shares of ABC, the auto company known to be furthest
along in developing an engine that can bum this fuel.62
Now consider the timing relating to the types of nonpublic information that are more
typically the basis of the three other types of informed trading. One such type of
information relates to an event that has already occurred and had an effect on the cash
position of the issuer available to shareholders. An example would be knowledge of a
defalcation that leaves the corporate treasury $100 million short of what is publicly
believed to be the case. Another such type of information relates to an event that has already
occurred and that will have a definite effect on future cash flows. An example would be
knowledge of a yet to be announced FDA approval of a new patented drug for which there
should be large demand. Yet, another relates to an event that is very likely to occur in the
near future and, if it does, will have a definite effect on future cash flows, but the facts
suggesting this high likelihood are not yet public-for example, facts suggesting a high
likelihood of such FDA approval very soon.
iii. Consequences for the Extent of Positive Impact on Economic Welfare
Keep in mind these two implications associated with fundamental value informed
trading-its incentive effects and its capacity to improve price accuracy for a long period
of time-and consider how the world would differ with and without the practice. Compare
this difference with how the world would differ with and without each of the other three
kinds of informed trading. For each of the four types of informed trading, if the particular
type were effectively banned, the accuracy of the price at some later point in time will
become as accurate of a predictor of an issuer's cash flow as it would have been earlier if
the particular type of trading had been allowed. The question is how much earlier would
this price accuracy improvement have come if this type of informed trading had been
62. See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
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allowed.63 If fundamental value informed trading were allowed, this price accuracy
improvement would often have come considerably earlier. For most informed trades of the
other three types, the price accuracy improvement would have come only slightly earlier
because the information would have been publicly announced and fully reflected in price
very soon. In essence, freely occurring fundamental value informed trading tends to make
share prices consistently more accurate-information with predictive value is created and
the resulting improvement in the accuracy with which the price predicts the cash flow
involved is considerably earlier than otherwise relative to when the cash flow is realized.64
This assessment suggests that the positive effects on price accuracy from fundamental
value informed trading result in a greater contribution to social welfare than the
contribution from the free occurrence of the other three kinds. To see why, recall that more
accurate prices benefit the economy by helping to allocate the economy's scarce capital to
the most promising potential real investment projects and by improving the utilization of
the economy's existing productive capacity through optimizing the signals provided to
management about investment decisions and the signals given to boards and shareholders
about the quality of management decisions.65 Informed trades, based on information that
will be fully reflected in price soon after the trade occurs, do little to help share prices
perform this kind of guiding work in the real economy. Conversely, informed trades that
are based on information that would not otherwise have been created and that improve
price accuracy well in advance of the cash flows they are predicting do help prices perform
this guiding kind of work. Put another way, efficient allocation of capital and good
corporate governance depend much more on how much information is reflected in price,
not on slight improvements in the timing of price accuracy improvements. What is
important about informative prices is that they impound information into prices at time
intervals relevant to the important decisions being made by actors in the real economy.
Important capital raising, takeover, and investment decisions tend to be made over the
course of many months and are unlikely to be affected by an improvement in price accuracy
for the short period between an informed trade and the information on which it was based
being disclosed in a company's regular course of business. 66
b. Comparison of Benefits with Costs
The social gains from freely occurring fundamental value informed trading must be
compared with the social losses. Freely occurring fundamental value informed trading
63. For a model that gives an important role to the lead time with which a price change better predicts a
subsequent cash flow, see Kenneth D. West, Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility, 56 ECONOMETRICA
37(1988).
64. See Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence,
102 MICH. L. REv. 331, 344-48 (2003) (elaborating on the concept of informed prices).
65. See supra Part II.B.L
66. See Schotland, supra note 2, at 1443 (citing studies); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Tapping the Brakes: Are Less
Active Market Safer and Better for the Economy?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 4-9 (2014),
https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/Documents/news/conferences/2014/fmc/Stiglitz.pdf
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increases illiquidity, which reduces social welfare because of the resulting misallocation of
67
resources over time and of risk. And, it draws resources into the business of fundamental
value informed trading that could be used elsewhere in the economy to produce other useful
goods and services.68
In our view, fundamental value informed trading's price-accuracy-increase-induced
improvements in the real economy-better capital allocation and better utilization of the
economy's existing productive capacity-outweigh the social losses associated with such
trading. In essence, the decision to allow fundamental value informed trading is a decision
to encourage the production of the information on which such trading is based with the
knowledge that the result will be a higher spread paid by uninformed traders, the incidence
of which is ultimately borne by entrepreneurs and investors prior to a firm becoming
publicly traded. Although our conclusion involves some speculation, fundamental value
information would probably be under produced from a social welfare point of view absent
this subsidy. Empirical evidence suggests that a substantial portion of the information that
is reflected in the share prices of public companies is the result of fundamental value
informed trading.69 There is also ample empirical evidence to suggest that accurate price
signals do in fact have efficiency-enhancing effects on managerial decisions, both in terms
of new investment decisions and the utilization of existing productive capacity. 70 Theory
suggests that the many imperfections in the market for the development of knowledge mean
that the information reflected in share prices would be underprovided if fundamental value
informed trading were prohibited: in essence such knowledge has the qualities of a public
good.
67. See supra Part Il.B.2.
68. It also reduces the resources going into the businesses of liquidity supply and price sensitive
fundamental trading and, thus, to the level of the socially valuable services they perform. There is no obvious
reason to believe these services would not be operating at their socially optimal levels absent the informed trading.
Finally, it draws resources into price decoding, thereby magnifying both the benefits and costs of the fundamental
value informed trading.
69. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT'L EcON.
REV. 1 (1969).
70. See FOUCAULT ET AL., supra note 42, at 361-68 (collecting relevant empirical studies); see, e.g., Philip
Bond et al., supra note 46; Artyom Dumev et al., Does More Firm Specific Stock Price Variation Mean More or
Less Informed Pricing?, 41 J. ACT. RES. 797 (2003); Artyom Dumev et al., Value Enhancing Capital Budgeting
and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation, 59 J. FIN. 65 (2004); Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the
Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. EcON. 187 (2000).
71. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE
AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIviTY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS (1962) (analyzing information as a
public good that we should expect to be under-produced). We know that capital constraints means that someone
who develops new information often cannot fully exploit its trading value through her own trading. And
imperfections in the market for information mean she may well not be able to fully exploit the remaining trading
value by selling the information. Thus the full trading value of the information in the circumstances that we
identify (advancing substantially in time when the information gets incorporated in price) may be less than the
benefit to the real economy that arises from the improvement in price accuracy resulting from the trades and so
such information is likely to be under produced. Put another way, price accuracy is valuable in ways that does
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B. Announcement Information
Announcement information is information contained in an announcement by an issuer
or other institution with direct implications as to the issuer's future cash flows.72 This
information remains announcement information only for the brief period of time between
when the announcement is made and when the information becomes fully reflected in price.
Success in announcement trading is based on a capacity to act with great speed.73 Often
this involves both a capacity to machine read whether a public announcement has positive
or negative implications for the issuer involved (doing so far faster than a human being
can), combined with a very fast capacity to send buy or sell orders to the relevant trading
venues.
1. Wealth Transfers and Fairness
The ex-post and ex-ante wealth transfer implications of announcement informed
trading are essentially identical to those of fundamental value informed trading, just
substituting announcement trading wherever fundamental value informed trading appears
in the discussion above. Accordingly, freely occurring announcement trading results in
more resources than otherwise being drawn into this business and hence increases the rents
paid to the suppliers of its specialized inputs. Because liquidity suppliers protect
themselves against such trading with wider spreads, it increases the cost of trading and
hence lessens demand for their services and reduces the rents paid to their suppliers of
specialized inputs. The wider spreads also make all trading, including all informed trading
more expensive. In essence, this is a crowding out effect, which reduces the rents paid to
the suppliers of their respective specialized inputs. As was discussed earlier, such effects
on the rents paid to the suppliers of specialized inputs needed by the various market
participants do not raise serious fairness issues. 74
Uninformed traders are on average neither advantaged nor disadvantaged by
announcement trading. Again, because uninformed traders' decisions are not motivated by
either information or price, they are as likely buyers as sellers if they happen to trade during
the brief moment before the announcement is fully reflected in price and thus are as likely
to be benefitted as harmed by an announcement trade's price impact. Announcement
trading will widen the bid-ask spread but share prices are discounted to reflect the extent
not go into the calculus of analysts, and so the value of price accuracy to the real economy involves a positive
externality and will be under produced. But see J. Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and
the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971) (arguing that due to potentially duplicative
information-generating activities, information could be over-produced, especially because the first to obtain that
information can often obtain a speculative advantage).
72. See generally Hu et al., supra note 27 (studying rapid trading and stock price adjustment in response to
the release of market-moving information).
73. See id. (documenting prices fully adjusting to information in less than 20 milliseconds).
74. See supra Part IV.A.3.
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to which it does so. 75 The cost of this increased spread again ultimately falls on
entrepreneurs and early investors, who face a higher cost of capital because of this
discount.76
In sum, the conclusion is the same as with fundamental value informed trading: rather
than fairness, the more important normative question concerning announcement trading
concerns its efficiency effects.
2. Efficiency Considerations
In our view, announcement trading is socially undesirable. Its capacity to augment the
speed with which market prices reflect already existing new information is of socially
insignificant benefit. The ways by which price accuracy improves the efficiency of the real
economy do not require anything like this speed.77 Moreover, announcement trading's
negative social effects are substantial. Announcement trading has all the same negative
efficiency effects from its adverse impact on liquidity as does any other type of informed
trading. In addition, it consumes scarce resources-talented people and sophisticated
equipment-that could be usefully employed elsewhere to provide goods and services of
value to society. Its crowding out effect reduces the level of fundamental value informed
trading, which is a socially desirable activity.7 8
C. Inside Information: The Issuer as Source
Issuer inside information is information not yet publicly available that is obtained
from within the issuer and is relevant to predicting the future cash flows paid to the holders
of the issuer's shares. Few topics have divided law and economics scholarship as deeply
as informed trading by issuer insiders. There is vociferous disagreement not only
concerning the justification for prohibiting such insider trading, but whether a prohibition
should exist at all.
For the first 30 years after the beginnings of federal securities regulation, there was a
widely shared perception on behalf of commentators that such insider trading was unfair
because it gave corporate insiders unique opportunities to capture the wealth generated by
corporations, a view still frequently expressed in judicial opinions and by some prominent
commentators. 79 A sea change was triggered by Henry Manne's 1966 publication of
75. Supra note 60 and accompanying text.
76. Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
77. See supra Part IV.A.4.
78. See supra Part IV.B.2.
79. See Friese v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 558, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (classifying insider trading
as "a manifestation of undue greed among the already well-to-do, worthy of legislative intervention if for no other
reason than to send a message of censure on behalf of the American people."). For scholars focused on
understanding insider trading through a fairness lens, see generally John A. C. Hetherington, Insider Trading and
the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 720 (1967); Homer Kripke, Manne 's Insider Trading Thesis and Other
Failures of Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945 (1985); Schotland, supra note 2; Seligman, supra note 52;
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"Insider Trading and the Stock Market." 80 Manne insisted that not only is such insider
trading not unfair, but that it is actually socially beneficial because it enhances efficiency,
and thus should be legal. Trading by issuer insiders enhances efficiency, in his view,
because it results in the speedier incorporation of information into stock vrices and because
it serves as an effective form of compensation for corporate managers.
In this section, we examine both the fairness and efficiency implications of issuer
insider informed trading. We will conclude that it is indeed not unfair, although public
perceptions to the contrary may still provide some justification for its prohibition. But we
will also conclude, contrary to Manne, that it makes the economy less, not more, efficient,
although this argument weakens and may, in fact, reverse itself in the case of trades based
on some forms of immaterial information-the accumulation of many small bits of
information that are not likely to be reflected in price for some time.
Some of the analysis that follows here simply collects and briefly summarizes aspects
of the large scholarly literature addressing insider trading written over the last few decades.
In doing so, we cannot hope to touch on all of insightful work in this area. Rather, we seek
to put in context our own particular contributions. Among other things, as will be
illustrated in Part V, we believe that our approach enables us to offer sharper analysis of
the tipper and tippee trading issues that only last year occupied the Supreme Court and will
likely preoccupy lower courts for years to come.
1. Wealth Transfers: Their Incentive and Fairness Effects
Understanding the wealth transfer implications of trading based on issuer inside
information is again most easily understood by starting with an example and seeing the ex-
post effect of the trade, and then considering, from an ex-ante perspective, what the impact
of the practice is as a generally known ongoing phenomenon. Much of this analysis
parallels our analysis of fundamental value informed trading and announcement trading
and will not need to be repeated here, but there are enough differences that it is worthwhile
starting with a new example for the ex-post analysis.
a. Ex-post Perspective
Suppose Y obtains from within EDF Inc. information, not known publicly or
otherwise reflected in price, that EDF is developing a new low-pollution engine that is
likely to pass the last few tests being held over the next two weeks. If, as expected within
EDF, the engine does pass the tests, EDF will be able to enter into some very profitable
contracts that will significantly improve the future cash flow paid out to holders of EDF
Green & Schmid, supra note 52; Loss, supra note 52.
80. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 94-95.
81. Id. at 80; Henry Manne, In Defense ofInsider Trading, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 114. See
also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2 and accompanying text. Other critics of the prohibition of insider trading
have provided a public choice analysis of insider trading regulation as essentially "purchased" by market
professionals from regulators. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private
Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 311 (1987) [hereinafter
Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand].
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shares compared to what is currently expected. Y uses a large number of orders, averaging
in aggregate 10,000 per trading day, to purchase 100,000 EDF shares over the ten trading
days in the two-week period. Prior to his purchases, EDF's NBB was $59.95 and NBO was
$60.05. For expository simplicity, assume that during this period Y is the only informed
trader of any kind and there is no publicly released information relevant to the value of
EDF's shares. So if Y had not made these purchases, the NBB and NBO would have
remained at or close to these levels throughout the two-week period. Instead, at the end of
two weeks, EDF's NBB is $62.95 and NBO is $63.05, with Y having paid an average of
$61.55 for each of his shares. The engine passes the tests, and at the end of the two-week
period, EDF announces the development at which time the price jumps such that the NBB
is 79.95 and NBO is $80.05.
From the point of view of trading gains and losses, the analysis of who is helped and
who is hurt as a result of Y's purchases during these two weeks is identical to the example
of X's trading in ABC shares used in the ex post analysis of fundamental value informed
trading, except that it is concentrated over two weeks instead of stretched over five
months.82 The same is true of the analysis as to why the NBB and NBO each increased as
a result of the informed purchases. 83 Y appears to have a trading gain in the neighborhood
of $1.85 million. Since trading is a zero-sum game, the gains and losses of all the other
players in the market must aggregate to a loss of the same amount. 84 The liquidity suppliers
would receive, and have executed against their quotes, 100,000 more buy orders than sell
orders and thus would be short by 100,000 shares at the time the announcement of the
engine development is made. As a result of Y's purchases, the liquidity suppliers sold, for
an average of $61.55, 100,000 shares that are now valued by the market at $80.00, i.e., the
liquidity traders' short positions translate into a loss equal to the same approximate $1.85
million gain enjoyed by Y. For the uninformed traders as a group, the increase of $3.00
over time in the bid and offer is a wash, with sellers as a group being better off than if Y
had not placed its orders, and buyers being equally worse off.
b. Ex-ante Perspective
Now consider the ex-ante wealth effects of freely occurring issuer insider trading in
longer run competitive equilibrium, assuming again, not unrealistically, that all the players
have unbiased (though not necessarily accurate) expectations concerning the prevalence of
issuer insider informed trading.
i. Issuer Insiders
In a world with freely occurring issuer insider trading, an insider, as a result of her
employment, gains the opportunity to obtain, and trade on, pieces of nonpublic
information. In a competitive market for managerial talent, the expected value of this
perquisite will reduce commensurately the aggregate value of the other components of her
82. See supra Part IV.A.I.a.
83. Id.
84. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 82.
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compensation package relative to a world without issuer insider trading. In either world, in
equilibrium, the insider will receive a compensation package with the same total expected
value and the shareholders will ultimately pay for this package. Thus, once again, the real
normative question concerning the desirability of this type of informed trading relates to
the efficiency of this kind of compensation, not to its fairness.
Having said this, it should be noted that the managerial labor market appears to be
very sticky.85 So a regulatory change that would allow an increase in the level of such
trading would, for some period of time, enrich managers who have access to nonpublic
issuer information. A regulatory change that would decrease the level would have the
opposite effect.
ii. Liquidity Suppliers
The analysis for liquidity suppliers directly parallels the analysis for them with regard
to fundamental value informed trading and announcement trading: freely occurring issuer
insider informed trading will lead them to quote a wider bid/ask spread than if the practice
were effectively prohibited.86 Cross-country empirical studies suggest that this difference
in the width of the spread would be substantial. One study examined the 103 countries with
stock markets (in 2002) and found that laws against insider trading existed in 87 of them,
with 38 of those countries having made a prosecution under their laws.87 There was a
significant reduction in firms' cost of capital, presumably reflecting greater share
liquidity when a country enacted and first enforced a prohibition against insider trading.89
Freely occurring issuer insider trading, by widening the spread and hence increasing the
cost of trading, would reduce the amount of liquidity supply demanded. Fewer resources
being drawn into the liquidity supply business would reduce the rents paid to the suppliers
of its specialized inputs.
iii. Uninformed Traders
The more significant conclusion, but one that flows from the identical analysis in the
cases of fundamental value informed trading and announcement trading, is that uninformed
85. Compare LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that executive compensation is excessive because
managers control boards and compensation contracts are not negotiated at arm's length), with Frank H.
Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984)
(arguing that executive contracting reflects the result of an efficient contracting process). Even assuming, as we
do, that competitive pressures in the managerial labor market will in the long run force this full reduction in other
forms of compensation, such an assumption is not inconsistent with believing that such wage adaptation may
occur quite slowly.
86. See Parts IV.A.4, IV.B.2.
87. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 104 (2002)
(stating that 38 countries included a majority of developed countries).
88. See supra Part lII.B.2.a.
89. Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 87, at 78.
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traders are on average neither directly advantaged nor disadvantaged by the free occurrence
of issuer insider informed trading. This again is because share prices are discounted to
reflect the extent to which such trading increases the bid-ask spread, with the cost of this
increased spread ultimately falling on entrepreneurs and early investors that face a higher
cost of capital because of this discount.90
It is worth noting again, given the much more heated debate concerning this kind of
informed trading, the illusory nature of some other losses and gains that some might say
are experienced by uninformed traders. The typical uninformed seller in our example
would likely regret her sale because, but for her sale of shares at some point during the two
weeks of Y's purchases at an average price of $61.45 shares, 9 1 she would have been
holding stock that could instead be sold for $79.95. Y's purchase, however, did not cause
her to miss out on this jump in price, because she would have sold whether Y had traded
or not.92 So, her regret is not properly related to Y's purchases. Indeed, the average
uninformed seller's price of $61.45 is $1.50 higher than it would have been but for Y's
purchases. From an ex-ante point of view, however, this average $1.50 gain is as illusory
as the regret, because the uninformed trader is just as likely to be a buyer as a seller when
the price has been pushed up in this way.
iv. Fundamental Value Informed and Anti-noise Traders
Freely occurring issuer insider trading's widened bid-ask spread will increase the cost
of business for fundamental value informed traders and anti-noise traders and thus will
reduce the level of such forms of trading, in essence crowding them out,93 and reduce the
resources going into these businesses and the rents paid to the suppliers of its specialized
inputs.94 The negative effect on the amount of information reflected in share prices can be
serious: cross-country studies demonstrate a significant positive relationship between the
effectiveness of a country's prohibition on issuer insider tradin and a measure of the
amount of information reflected in the share prices of its issuers.
90. See Part IV.A.2.d.
91. In the example, Y purchased at the offer for an average price of $61.55, which implies that the average
sale at the bid by uninformed sellers would have been at $61.45.
92. In contrast, the price sensitive fundamental trader has a reasonable claim that but for the insider's
purchase, he would not have sold and would instead be holding shares that could be sold for about $18.50 more,
because his sale was prompted by the rise in EDF's share price resulting from Y's purchases.
93. See infra Part IV.D. See also Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Haggerty, Insider Trading and the
Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 110 (1992); Stiglitz, supra note 66. This is the fundamental
argument of the seminal piece. Goshen, supra note 2, at 1238-43.
94. For a political economy explanation of SEC insider trading enforced prompted by fundamental value
informed traders and liquidity suppliers seeking to protect profits, see Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand,
supra note 82.
95. Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical
Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 275-77 (2007) (finding that
cross-nationally more rigorous insider trading laws are associated with more accurate stock prices and greater
liquidity).
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2. Efficiency Effects: Claimed Social Benefits
The claimed positive efficiency effects of freely occurring issuer insider trading relate
to price accuracy and its desirability as a form of managerial compensation.
a. Price Accuracy Effects
Trading by informed issuer insiders, like all informed trading, moves price in the
direction of what it would be if the information on which they are trading was fully
reflected in price. Thus, in this narrow sense, such trading makes prices more accurate.
There is a serious question, however, as to whether it actually accelerates the reflection of
already existing information in price. Even if it does, it generally advances the moment by
which information gets reflected in price by very little, which renders the social gain, if
any, insignificant.
i. Delaying Versus Accelerating Issuer Disclosure
Freely occurring issuer insider trading may, in many cases, actually delay, not
accelerate, the moment existing information gets reflected in share prices.96 Insiders would
have an incentive to cause the issuer to delay disclosure of the information on which they
are trading in order to maximize the profitability of their trades by slowly buying large
amounts of stock.97 While these trades will move price in the right direction, typically only
with public disclosure will the information be fully reflected in price.98
There is a response to this argument: insider trading might actually create incentives
for faster public disclosure because once insiders trading ceases, they want the information
disclosed immediately and fully reflected in price. 99 The insider can then close her position
and take her full profits as quickly as possible, thereby ending the risks associated with her
concentrated position in the issuer's stock.' 00
96. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 59, at 333.
97. For empirical evidence that various indirect methods of insider trading can negatively affect the quality
of issuer disclosure, see Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading Via the Corporation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 831-33
(2014) (disclosures in advance of issuer share repurchases where managers own issuer stock); Robert M. Dames
et al., Right on Schedule: CEO Option Grants and Opportunism (Jan. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2363148 (disclosures in advance of upcoming scheduled
option grants based on the current share price).
98. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 568-69; Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market
Prices, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1995 (describing how information is incorporated into price). Capital
constraints limit the amount of trading that issuer insider informed traders can trade and noise hampers the ability
of others trying to decode what the insiders know based on observed price changes. Sandford J. Grossman &
Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility ofInformationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
99. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 879 (insider trading may accelerate the speed of disclosure).
100. See supra note 53.
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ii. The Unimportance ofDelay or Acceleration
Ultimately, the question of delay versus advance is an empirical one and rigorous
work on the issue is lacking. More fundamentally, the kind of insider trading that a
prohibition can effectively catch and that, in the absence of prohibition would be most
tempting, will probably be a trade shortly before an anticipated corporate announcement.
Thus the period over which price accuracy would be improved, whether accelerated or
delayed, is going to be brief in any case. As discussed above, when informed trading
improves price accuracy for only a brief period of time, the improvement will not have any
important effects on enhancing the efficiency of the real economy.1
To explore this argument, we are assembling a novel dataset through coding SEC
enforcement releases concerning insider trading. We inquire as to two issues. First, what
is the time lag between when the insider traders acquire their position and when the
information on which they trade would have otherwise become public? Second, what is the
informational content on which they typically trade? Based on results from the year 2016,
covering insider trading on 90 separate events, we find that the time lag between the
insider's initiating transaction and public disclosure of the event on which the insider traded
ranges from one day to 101 days, with three days being the modal time lag between the
unlawful transaction and public disclosure. The average lag is 25 days, and the median lag
is 19 days. Interestingly, in the vast majority of enforcement actions, the information on
which the insider trades concerns an impending acquisition. The few other pieces of
nonpublic information involve asset acquisitions, earnings announcements, and licensing
announcements. In other words, those insiders that the SEC actually prosecutes for illegal
trading overwhelmingly trade on forms of information that they do not need incentives to
carefully analyze and probe, and which would have become public soon in any event.
b. Managerial Compensation
A second efficiency argument for issuer insider trading, again pioneered by Henry
Manne, is that insider informed trading can serve as a particularly effective compensation
arrangement to induce managers in large bureaucratic corporations to act more
entrepreneurially.102 If managers can freely profit from trading based on their knowledge
of an issuer's future performance, they have additional incentives to achieve
accomplishments that, when announced, will constitute the kind of good news that drives
up the issuer's share price. However, this argument too is open to significant rebuttals.
i. Distorted Incentives to Choose Risk Over Expected Return
The managerial incentives provided by insider trading may in fact be neutral. Selling
after undertaking undisclosed actions that will drive firm performance down is just as
101. See supra Parts IV.A.2.a, IV.B.2.
102. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 110-20.
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profitable as buying after undisclosed actions that will drive it up. Even if these bets against
the firm could be fully deterred by rules, such as Exchange Act section 16(c)'s prohibition
on short selling by issuer officers and directors, 103 this rebuttal is suggestive of another
point: insider trading can incentivize managers to make the riskier decision-because of
its bigger upside, even where the less risky choice would have a higher expected return and
thus, would be better for shareholders and for the efficiency of the economy as a whole. 104
ii. Inefficient Allocation ofRisk
Allowing insider trading is an inherently risky form of comp ensation and as such
allocates risk between managers and shareholders inefficiently. 10 An issuer is a wealth
generating entity whose residual returns, after paying for labor and other inputs, are shared
between managers and shareholders. The returns on this wealth-generating entity are
inherently volatile, with much of this volatility coming from firm-specific risk. The typical
managerial compensation arrangement divides these volatile residuals up between
managers and shareholders. At one extreme would be a straight fixed salary with no insider
trading allowed. At the other extreme would be no salary but permission to engage in
insider trading to the extent that the expected value of this right equals that of the straight
salary. On an expected basis, each of these two compensation arrangements is equally
costly to shareholders. In the first, the volatility in future residuals is fully borne by the
shareholders. In the second, the shareholders bear only a portion of this volatility, with the
rest being borne by the managers.
Shareholders are the more efficient bearers of this risk.106 This is because they can
diversify their portfolio of stock holdings and completely eliminate the firm-specific
portion of the risk. Managers, in contrast, are already inherently undiversified, because
they have developed substantial firm-specific human capital.107 The firm-specific portion
of the residual volatility that they take on with the insider trading arrangement, which also
cannot be diversified away, just adds to the problem and will cause them disutility. Thus,
managers will be willing to agree to a package with lower expected compensation if it does
not include a risky insider trading right component. Shareholders, because of their capacity
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015) (prohibiting insiders from short selling).
104. This proposition assumes that the manager waits until she sees the ultimate results of the decision but
before the results are publicly known. The ability to inside trade provides the manager with an option that is only
exercised if the results are positive. All else equal, the riskier an option is, the more valuable. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice among Risky Projects, 29 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 12-13 (1994) (discussing that insider trading leads to riskier projects). That insider
trading could lead to riskier choices of projects is a familiar insight of the insider trading literature. See, e.g.,
Thomas Ulen, The Coasian Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 324-25 (1993); Seligman, supra
note 52.
105. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 59, at 332 (comparing the risk of insider trading as
compensation for managers to "paying managers in lottery tickets").
106. Cf Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1679, 1687-88 (1996) (firms are generally superior risk-bearers relative to managers).
107. See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, The Law and Economics of Employee Information Exchange in
the Knowledge Economy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 651, 674 (2004) (stating "employees have a fairly limited
ability to diversify their human capital portfolio" relative to investors' ability "to diversify their wealth").
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to diversify, suffer no disutility from bearing this package's extra risk. So, a package
without an insider trading component, if it can be effectively enforced, would be the one
that both managers and shareholders would choose.
iii. Poorly Focused Reward br Perfbrmance and Distorted Internal Communications
The idea of insider trading profits as an effective compensation tool also suffers from
being unrealistic because there is generally a low correlation between who is responsible
for the accomplishments that, when announced, will constitute good news and who might
be able to profit from trading in anticipation of the announcement. So, for instance, the
head of a division responsible for a major development is likely to represent only one of
many corporate insiders who will be aware of this news prior to its public disclosure and
able to profit by trading on it. The result is a poorly focused incentive scheme where the
person responsible for corporate improvements will internalize only a fraction of insider
trading profits. Even more serious, the opportunity to inside trade might result in corporate
insiders working less effectively as a team. Those acquiring information first may, rather
than sending it immediately to others, hold back until they can maximize their own trading
profits without the competition of the others. 108
3. Efficiency Considerations: Social Losses
Freely occurring issuer insider informed trading has substantial negative social
effects. It has the same adverse impact on liquidity as does any other type of informed
trading. As discussed, less liquidity reduces social welfare because of the resulting
misallocation of resources over time and misallocation of risk. 109 It also reduces
significantly the level of fundamental value informed trading, which we have concluded is
a socially desirable activity.
Issuer insider informed trading has an additional social cost not present with
fundamental value informed trading and announcement informed trading. While we find
that issuer insider informed trading is not unfair, much of the public feels that it is. This
perception of unfairness is demoralizing: it harms people to think that a major social
institution is corrupt. It also discourages direct and indirect ownership of equities by
108. See generally Robert J. Haft, The Effect ofInsider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982) (exploring the potentially adverse effects of permitting insider trading
on decision-making within large businesses).
109. See supra Part III.B.2. The negative effects of insider trading on liquidity, and to a lesser extent price
accuracy, have already been noted by a vast and rich legal literature, often arguing in favor of existing legal bans.
For just a sampling of classic papers, see Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 11-12; Mark J. Loewenstein & William
K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 74-77 (2005); William K.S. Wang, Stock
Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies - Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used
Car with a Generic Defect, 45 VILL. L. REV. 27, 38 (2000); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders'Profits, Costs of Trading,
and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 190-92 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, From
Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REv. 563, 589 (2005). Others have
come to more ambivalent conclusions based on the finance literature. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady,
Roberts: The Ideology and Practice ofInsider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1319, 1324 (1999) (stating
that the alleged injury to investors from insider trading is yet unidentified).
2018] 855
The Journal of Corporation Law
persons who, absent this perception, would find equities to be an investment vehicle that
suits some of their needs, thereby blocking what would otherwise be welfare improving
transactions. Normally, the better response to public misunderstanding is education. This
perception of unfairness may be very hard to eradicate, however, and a generally effective
prohibition on insider trading is another way of dealing with the perception's unfortunate
effects.
4. Overall Policy Conclusions
The foregoing discussion strongly suggests that freely occurring informed trading by
issuer insiders would be socially undesirable. While the practice does not, as many believe,
work a wealth-redistributing unfairness, it does generally lead to inefficiency. Both the
share price accuracy and compensation efficiency social benefit arguments for allowing
such trading are unpersuasive. And, as just recounted, its costly effects on liquidity clearly
have a number of negative effects on efficiency, as does the widespread perception that it
is unfair.
Four further questions need to be addressed, however. First, is it necessary that
informed trading by the insiders of all issuers be banned, or would this be better decided
on an issuer by issuer basis? Second, does trading based on all inside information need to
be banned or just trades based on material information? Third, what are the social
consequences of trades based on tippees of issuer insiders? Finally, do the conclusions
concerning the social undesirability of trading by issuer insiders apply as well to issuers
themselves?
a. Should Issuers be able to Consent to Insiders Trading?
Nothing in this analysis so far suggests that it matters whether or not the issuer
consents to the trading by its insiders. If the analysis above is correct, the claimed efficiency
benefits are just as unpersuasive, and the negative efficiency effects are just as substantial,
with or without the issuer's consent. We cannot be sure, however, that the analysis above
is correct as to every single issuer in the market. Thus, an argument can be made that each
issuer should be able to adopt a olicy publicly allowing its insiders to trade as long as the
policy is publicly announced. Suppose our conclusion that insider trading is efficiency
diminishing is correct with respect to a given issuer. The market will price the issuer's
stock lower if it nevertheless did allow insider trading. Because the entrepreneurs and
original investors want as high a share price as possible when they take the issuer public,
they would have strong incentives to impose a binding prohibition on insider trading in its
shares. 11 If, instead, the analysis is incorrect with respect to a given issuer, allowing
insider trading would result in a higher share price at the time that the issuer goes public
and the entrepreneurs and original investors would allow for insider trading. In essence,
110. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 866-68.
111. Laura Nyantung Beny & Anita Anand, Private Regulation of Insider Trading in the Shadow of Lax
Public Enforcement: Evidence from Canadian Firms, 3 HARv. Bus. L. REv. 215 (2013) (showing that many firms
adopt precisely such policies).
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the reaction of the market would force the issuer to absorb the loss if trading by its insiders
would really be inefficient and enjoy the gain if it were efficient, and thus guide the firm
to the most efficient choice.
There is some force to this argument, but we are ultimately skeptical. One reason is
that there are probably substantial scale economies in an effective enforcement mechanism
against issuer insider informed trading.112 So, if there is good reason to believe that it is
inefficient for most issuers, the restriction should apply to all.113 Another reason relates to
all companies that are already publicly traded. Even if allowing issuer insider informed
trading would be inefficient at such a firm, its managers typically own only a small portion
of the stock. They would likely have much more to gain from being able to inside trade
than they would lose from the decline in the value of their stock. If the managers are either
given the power to decide the question or have a heavy influence on a shareholder vote on
it, the firm will consent when it is socially undesirable for it to do so.
b. Insider Trading on Small Bits ofNonpublic Information
As discussed, the reasons for finding issuer insider informed trading to be socially
undesirable are strongest for a trade shortly before an anticipated corporate announcement.
This is the kind of insider trading that a prohibition can most effectively catch and that, in
the absence of prohibition, would be most tempting. It is also the kind with the poorest
ratio of social benefits to social costs.
Consider, in contrast, a purchase by a corporate insider where she concludes, based
on a myriad of individually small pieces of nonpublic information about which she is
inevitably aware, that the issuer's shares are worth more than the current market price. Her
purchase will move the price in the direction of reflecting these many small pieces of
information and thus make the price more accurate. Most of these pieces of information
will probably never be disclosed voluntarily or pursuant to mandatory disclosure. This is
because there are so many of them, each of which is individually of little importance. Often,
also, disclosure would be harmful to the issuer's ability to compete. Absent insider trading
based on this information, it will not be reflected in price until much later when the good
or bad results that they predict materialize.
The complaint that allowing this type of insider trading would incentivize managers
to take risky decisions at the expense of expected return is also inapplicable to this kind of
insider trading. In making purchases based on such information, managers would need to
face both the upside and downside risks since they would need to make their purchases
112. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model ofInsider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
1449, 1467-68 (1987).
113. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, and POLICY 6 (1991)
(monitoring insiders' trading activities likely to display considerable economies of scale); see also Jonathan R.
Macey, From Fairness to Contract. The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 9, 59 (1984) (explaining that contract law remedies available to firms damaged by insider trading are
insufficient to achieve an optimal level of enforcement.).
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well before the results of their decisions were in.
There is considerable evidence that this kind of insider trading occurs and is
profitable. Officers and directors are required under Exchange Act 16(a) to report all
purchases and sales. Presumably most officers and directors comply except for trades that
violate Rule 1Ob-5. Officers and directors appear to make above market returns on their
reported purchases and sales of their own firms' shares that they report in their 16(a)
filing. 114
c. Trading by Tippees
A trade by a tippee of an issuer insider is no different in its negative effect on liquidity
than a trade by the insider herself. Moreover, if the insider receives a benefit in return, or
the satisfaction of making a gift to someone, allowing such tippee trading has just the same
managerial incentive effects, good and bad, as allowing trades by the insider herself: the
insider just gets the benefit or satisfaction instead of getting the profit from the trade. There
are no such managerial incentive effects if the tip is not a gift and no benefit is received by
the insider. But then the trade does not serve as an alternative form of compensation that
can reduce the size of other components of the compensation package. In sum, absent
some additional considerations relevant to a particular case, informed trades by tippees are
at least as socially undesirable as trades by insiders.
d. Trading by an Issuer Possessing Material Information or by Persons to Whom It Gives
the Information
Trading by an issuer possessing material non-public information is socially
undesirable. It has the same positive price accuracy effects and negative liquidity effects
as trading by an issuer insider. This is a tradeoff that we concluded involves a net social
loss. There are no obvious other efficiency benefits when it is the issuer that is trading
instead, and so the same conclusion should apply to this trading as well.
We also concluded that trades by direct or indirect tippees of issuer insiders are
socially undesirable. Again, the analysis behind this conclusion applies as well to trades by
outsiders based on such information where its provision to them for trading was authorized
by the issuer.
D. Inside Information: A Non-Issuer Source
Trades can also be based on confidential information relevant to predicting an issuer's
future cash flows that is obtained from within an institution other than the issuer. This
institution could be, for example, a potential acquirer of the issuer (or the potential
acquirer's investment bank or law firm), a hedge fund or other institutional investor, or a
financial research company. The analysis of the social desirability of such trades largely
tracks the analysis of the desirability of trading based on information generated within the
114. See generally H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & ECON.
149,157,172-75(1992).
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issuer, in particular the wealth transfer and fairness parts of the analysis. Ultimately,
however, we will reach a somewhat different conclusion. We found trades based on
material information generated within the issuer to be socially undesirable no matter who
executes them. In contrast, we find many kinds of trades based on information generated
within a non-issuer institution to be socially desirable. This difference in conclusions
relates to how sensitive the generation of each of the two types of information is to the
prospect of profits from trading on it. Specifically, most material information from within
an issuer is the synergistic byproduct of the operations of the underlying business and thus
will be generated whether or not the issuer or its insiders are allowed to trade on it. And, it
will be reflected in price soon in any event. Much of the information material to an issuer
from within a non-issuer institution, however, would not be generated unless the institution,
or others approved by it, are allowed to trade on the information.
1. Socially Desirable Trades
Recall the definition of fundamental value informed trading: trading based on
information generated by a person who gathers various bits of information that are publicly
available or observable and analyzes them in a sophisticated way that enables a superior
assessment of an issuer's cash flows to that implied by the current stock price. When an
institution other than the issuer develops confidential material information about the issuer
that enables such a superior assessment, it is very likely to be fundamental value
information-indeed sufficiently likely that it seems appropriate for our purposes here to
classify all such information developed by a non-issuer institution as fundamental value
information. Thus, in accordance with our earlier analysis, a trade by a non-issuer
institution based on confidential material information that it has developed is socially
desirable. It reduces liquidity with the consequent negative effects on efficiency in the same
way that an issuer insider trade does. But, this efficiency loss is more than counterbalanced
by the efficiency gains arising from the incentives that are created to do the hard work of
generating price-accuracy-enhancing information and to get it reflected in price.115
Using the same logic, where the institution allows someone else, whether an insider
or outside person, to trade on such information, this trade is socially beneficial as well. The
institution can be expected to try to maximize the returns it can garner from generating
such information by authoritatively deciding to whom, if anyone, to communicate the
information. The institution could also specify the terms of its use, including, whether it
can traded upon by the recipient, whether it can be recommunicated one or more times,
and, if it can be recommunicated, the terms that each recommunicating person must impose
on her recipient. The institution presumably only authorizes such use when it calculates
that its benefits from doing so equal or exceed any loss from its trading profits.
This logic again applies as we contemplate the information being handed down
through a chain of recipients. The more money the institution's direct recipient can make
from trading on it or communicating it to yet others, the more consideration the direct
recipient will be willing to provide the institution originally generating the information. If
115. See supra Part IV.A.4.b.
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the direct recipient is permitted by the institution's terms to communicate the information
to others, the direct recipient will go through the same calculations in determining its terms,
and so on down the chain, if further communications are allowed by the originating
institution and each prior recipient. Thus, assuming there are one or more levels of
authorized indirect recipients, there will be a whole network of agreements and duties
specifying who is allowed to trade and under what conditions.116
2. Socially Undesirable Trades
Any trading not approved by this network of agreements and duties is socially
undesirable. Such unapproved trading reduces liquidity, with the consequent negative
efficiency effects, to the same extent as would trading by the outside institution itself or by
trades approved by this network. But, unlike trading by the institution or approved by this
network, unauthorized trading creates no compensating, efficiency-enhancing incentives
to gather and analyze price-accuracy-improving information. 117 Rather, the unapproved
inside trade has the opposite effect, reducing the profitability of the institution's efforts to
gather information and analyze it in a superior way. If the institution itself is planning to
trade, the insider's early trades make the prices at which the institution trades less
advantageous. If instead, the institution seeks to profit from selling the information to
someone else who will trade on it or from simply publicly announcing the information, the
information is less valuable to the purchaser if an unapproved person has already begun to
move price in the indicated direction by trading on it first.
In sum, where the institution is allowed to provide confidential information to others
to trade on or otherwise utilize, its incentives for generating such information are at least
as great or greater than if it were the only one that could trade the information. This
depends, however, on the system of informed trading prohibitions that prevent trades
outside of what is authorized by the resulting network of agreements and duties. The more
effectively the prohibitions do this, the greater are the incentives of outside institutions to
engage in the socially desirable practice of generating share-price-accuracy enhancing
information.
V. LEGAL REGULATION: DETERRING UNDESIRABLE INFORMED TRADING AND
ENCOURAGING DESIRABLE INFORMED TRADING
The level of informed trading of various types is affected in the United States and
elsewhere by a complex, and far from coherent, jumble of legal rules. These rules directly
116. These terms include, unless the institution affirmatively reverse them, obligations that arise because of
the status of the recipient, for example the obligation of an agent of the institution such as its lawyer or investment
bank, not to use for its own purposes confidential information received from the institution. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
117. The unapproved trade does improve price accuracy in the sense of getting the information that is
generated by the institution reflected sooner in price. Like trading by an issuer insider, however, the non-issuer
insider is most likely to trade only shortly before the outside institution itself would have transacted itself or made
an announcement. Again, such a brief improvement in price accuracy will not enhance the efficiency of the real
economy in any meaningful way. See supra Part IV.A.4, IV.B.2.
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prohibit some types of informed trades and indirectly discourage or encourage others. In
this Part, we will explore this pattern of regulatory impacts to see how close what is
prohibited or discouraged comes to what the preceding analysis suggests are the socially
undesirable informed trades and how close what is encouraged comes to what it suggests
are the socially desirable ones.
Four types of legal rules will be considered here: (1) rules that outright prohibit certain
kinds of informed trades; (2) rules that require, under certain circumstances, the return of
profits from the informed trader to the issuer of the shares; (3) mandatory disclosure rules;
and (4) rules governing the structure of the markets for secondary trading.
A. Informed Trading Prohibitions
The most prominent U.S. prohibition of certain informed trades has emerged out of
the courts' and SEC's interpretations of Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. After an exploration of the history and current reach of these
prohibitions, we will consider, in subsequent sections, the use of New York's Martin Act
to stop certain informed trades and two comprehensive statutory schemes for regulating
informed trading: the EU's Market Abuse Directive and the proposed U.S. Insider Trading
Prohibition Act.
1. Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5: History ofDevelopment of the Current Law
The Exchange Act is the primary statute in the United States regulating the secondary
trading of securities. No provision of the Exchange Act, including Section 10(b), explicitly
prohibits any kind of informed trading. Section 10(b) simply prohibits certain
"manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s] in contravention of' rules and
regulations prescribed by the SEC "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors." 1 19 The SEC promulgated Rule 1 Ob-5 in 1943 pursuant to
Section 10(b), but that rule too contains no explicit prohibition of any type of informed
trading. The closest it comes to doing so is to prohibit, "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security," employing "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or engaging
"in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person."20 A brief history of the evolving interpretation of these phrases
in the statute and the rule can help explain Rule 1Ob-5's current, rather jury-rigged, set of
prohibitions on certain types of informed trading.
a. The Early History of the Development of the Doctrine
It was thirty years after the passage of the Exchange Act and more than twenty years
after Rule 1Ob-5's promulgation before either the SEC or a court rendered the first opinion
118. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2015).
119. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b).
120. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
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holding that Section 10(b) could be violated by some kind of informed trading on a
secondary exchange. This opinion, by the SEC in Cady, Roberts & Co.,121 related to the
appropriateness of a Rule 1Ob-5 based disciplinary action against a broker who received
nonpublic information from a company's director that the company was about to announce
a dividend cut. The broker, ahead of the announcement, quickly sold the company's shares
for various accounts over which he had discretion.122 The source of the information-the
director-was apparently under a reasonably based, but mistaken, belief that the news was
already public and phoned the broker to find out the market reaction. Not reaching the
broker, he left a message that effectively communicated the cut.123 The Commission ruled
that a person who has a special relationship with the company and is privy to its internal
affairs violates Rule lOb-5 if she trades in its stock without disclosing any material
nonpublic information in her possession.124 The broker was a partner in a brokerage firm
for which the director was a registered representative and this connection with the company
was enough to find the needed relationship.125 Four years later, the Second Circuit, in dicta
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,126 citing Cady Roberts, dispensed with the need for a
relationship with the issuer, an interpretation that greatly expanded the range of persons
whose informed trades would violate Rule 1Ob-5. The court stated "anyone in possession
of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public or . . . must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed." 127
b. Chiarella and Its Aftermath
The Second Circuit's very broad dicta in Texas GulfSulphur was rejected twelve years
later by the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States, which held that "a duty to disclose
under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information."l28
The defendant, Chiarella, learned of several yet-to-be-announced hostile tender offers from
his work at a financial printing firm preparing the offering documents. Chiarella's
employment contract pledged him to keep confidential, and not to trade on, what he learned
at work. He nevertheless purchased shares of each target and resold them for a predictably
higher price after the offer's announcement. The District Court found Chiarella guilty of a
criminal violation of Rule lOb-5 and sentenced him to a year in prison, which the Second
Circuit upheld. Chiarella appealed to the Supreme Court.
At the Supreme Court level, each of the Supreme Court Justices in the Chiarella case
appears to have believed that more than mere possession of material nonpublic information
was necessary for a trader to violate Rule 1Ob-5. A majority, based on the narrow holding
121. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
122. Id. at 908.
123. Id. at 909.
124. Id. at 912.
125. Id.
126. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
127. Id. at 848 (emphasis added). The statement was dicta because the actual defendants were officers or
high level employees of the company.
128. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
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that mere possession was not enough, voted to reverse the Second Circuit's affirmation of
the convictions. The nine Justices splintered, however, on how much more than mere
possession was needed and whether evidence of whatever more he believed was needed
was presented to the jury.
i. The Classical Theory ofInsider Trading
Justice Powell was joined by three other Justices in his opinion setting out the
"classical theory" of insider trading. Under this theory, there needs to be "a relationship of
trust and confidence between the parties to a transaction."l29 Powell stated that Chiarella
had no such relationship with the sellers of the target companies' securities and that "[h]e
was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market
transactions." 1 30
ii. The Misappropriation and Structural Access Theories
Justice Burger's dissent set out the "misappropriation theory" of insider trading.
Under this theory, trading by someone not in such a relationship with his counterparty
nevertheless violates Rule lOb-5 if he trades on material nonpublic information that he Has
"misappropriated."131 Applying this theory, Burger believed Chiarella violated Rule lob-
5 because the breach of his confidentiality a reement with his employer meant his trades
were based on misappropriated information. 32 Two other Justices, Stevens and Brennan,
expressed a willingness to entertain the misappropriation theory, but joined the part of
Justice Powell's opinion reversing the conviction based on the narrow holding that mere
possession while trading was not enough for a violation. They did so because they did not
believe the misappropriation theory had been presented to the jury.133
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, set out in a separate dissent yet a third
theory of insider trading, "structural access." Under this theory, trading on material
nonpublic information by someone who was neither in a relationship of trust and
confidence with the other party, nor was trading on the information in violation of a duty
owed to some third party, would nevertheless violate Rule lob-5 if she obtained the
information as the result of a "structural informational advantage."' 34
A clear majority in Chiarella believed that not only was mere possession insufficient,
129. Id. at 230. Powell's discussion of the reach of Rule 1Ob-5 assumed that the non-disclosed information
was material, thus suggesting that a trade on the basis of immaterial information would be legal even by an insider.
If Congress had wished to prohibit all informed trading by corporate insiders, whether or not material, there would
have been a simple way of doing so: ban all purchases or sales of an issuer's stock by corporate insiders for as
long as the insiders maintain that status-a path not taken.
130. Id. at 232-33.
131. Id. at 240.
132. Id. at 243-44.
133. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237-38.
134. Id. at 251.
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mere structural access was insufficient as well. The status of the misappropriation theory,
however, was unclear. This uncertainty was finally resolved by the Court seventeen years
later in the O'Hagan case. 135 The defendant, O'Hagan, was a lawyer who learned of the
confidential plans of his firm's client to engage in a hostile tender offer and purchased the
proposed target's shares. O'Hagan was convicted at trial based on the misappropriation
theory. The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, affirmed the conviction, holding
that a Rule 1Ob-5 violation "may be predicated on the misappropriation theory",136 and
found that trading on nonpublic material information violates Rule 1 Ob-5 where the trade
was "in breach of a duty [of loyalty and confidentiality] owed to the source of the
information." 1 3 7
iii. Tipper and Tippee Liability for Information Coming from within the Issuer
The tipper/tippee situation arises when there is trading by a person (the recipient) who
learns material nonpublic information, directly or indirectly, from a person (the source)
who, if she traded on it herself, would violate Rule 1Ob-5. Consider first the situation where
the source is an insider of the issuer, the recipient has no connection with the issuer, and
the source willingly, but without the issuer's permission, provides the information to the
recipient. The source would violate Rule lOb-5 if she herself traded in the stock because
she would be regarded as being in a relationship of trust and confidence with the issuer's
shareholders.138 But it is the recipient, not the source, who is trading. The recipient has no
special relationship of trust and confidence with either the persons with whom he deals or
with the source. So, at first blush, neither the tip by the source, nor the- trade by the
recipient, would appear to violate Rule 1Ob-5 under either the classical theory or the
misappropriation theory.
Justice Powell, in dictum in his Chiarella opinion, found an inventive way around this
problem. He suggested that the source, who is deemed to be in such a relationship with
the issuer's shareholders, breaches her duty to these shareholders by providing the
information to someone likely to trade on it, and the recipient, by trading on it, becomes a
"participant after the fact" in the source's breach.139 This theory became the basis of a
holding three years later in Dirks v. SEC, where Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
said that:
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade
on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his
135. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
136. Id. at 650.
137. Id. at 652 (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg, in an effort to better connect this breach with the
language of Section 10(b) and its reference to a "deceptive device," argued that "misappropriators ... deal in
deception" because "[a] fiduciary who '[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's
information for personal gain' . . . 'dupes' or defrauds the principal." Id. at 653-54.
138. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
139. Id.at230n.12.
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fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing his information to the tippee and
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach. 140
In Dirks, however, Powell added an additional wrinkle that went beyond his dictum
in Chiarella. He concluded that a breach of duty to the shareholders re uires that the tipper
"personally . . . benefit, directly or indirectly, from [her] disclosure,' not just that the
transfer of information was in violation of the issuer's determination that it be kept
confidential. Thus, for the source to violate Rule 1Ob-5, she must have this personal benefit,
and for the direct recipient to violate the Rule, he must be aware of this benefit. The
personal benefit requirement is also met, however, when the information is a gift to a
relative or friend. 14 Justice Powell apparently added the personal benefit re uirement to
avoid chilling analyst interviews, which he regarded as socially beneficial. 1  Without it,
the source and the recipient in such an interview could each violate Rule lOb-5 when they
mistakenly thought that the information was not material or was already public. 144
Now consider trades by more remote tippees: those who receive the information
directly or indirectly from the direct recipient. They can violate Rule 1Ob-5 in either of two
ways. One is where the trader is aware of the breach by the original source, including the
source's personal benefit. Such a trader is as much a participant after the fact in the breach
by the original source of his duty to the issuer's shareholders as would be a direct recipient
who trades. 145 The other way is where the trader has a relationship with the person
providing him the information that imposes on the trader a duty of confidentiality. The
trade, as a breach of the recipient's duty to this provider, is a Rule lOb-5 violation based
on the misappropriation theory-a violation that does not depend on his knowledge
concerning the original breach by the insider. 146
Recently, in Salman v. United States, the Supreme Court elaborated upon the gift
branch of the personal benefit test in ways particularly relevant to remote tippees.147 The
tipper and the direct tippee in this case were brothers who each pled guilty to a Rule lOb-
5 violation. There was evidence that they had a close relationship. The defendant, Salman,
was the tipper's brother-in-law and, as part of a close extended family, received the
information from the direct tippee and traded upon it. Thus, he was obviously aware of the
140. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 662. For an extensive discussion of the genesis of the personal benefit test, see Adam C. Pritchard,
Dirks and the Genesis ofPersonal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857 (2015).
142. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
143. Id. at 658-59.
144. Id. at 662.
145. See, e.g., SEC v. Musella, 678 F.Supp. 1060, 1062-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (defendants "should have
known that fiduciary duties were being breached with respect to confidential, non-public information"); In re
Motel 6 Sec. Litig., 161 F. Supp. 2d 227,242 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[A] defendant's subjective belief that information
received 'was obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty . .. may .. . be shown by circumstantial evidence."').
146. In each of these two cases, if someone who himself is prohibited from trading instead, or in addition,
tips someone else, he would violate Rule lOb-5 as a tipper.
147. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
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relationship between the tipper and direct tippee. He also knew the tipper was the origin of
the information on which he traded. Salman argued that he had not violated Rule 1Ob-5,
however, because there was no evidence that the tipper received anything of a pecuniary
or similarly valuable nature in exchange for the information, evidence that Salman said
was required by some of the language in the recent Second Circuit decision in U.S. v.
Newman.148 Salman was found guilty at trial and his conviction was upheld by the Ninth
Circuit. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the Dirks
personal benefit test
require[s] proof of 'an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents
at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,' as the Second
Circuit held in [Newman] . . . , or is it enough that the insider and the tippee
shared a close family relationship, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case.149
In its unanimous opinion, the Court cleared up some confusing language in Newman
that appeared to eliminate altogether the gift branch of the Dirks personal benefit test. 150
Equally important, it addressed the question of what kind of evidence is sufficient for a
jury to infer that the source received a personal benefit in the form of making a gift. It
concluded that evidence of the existence of a close family or friendship relationship-all
that Salman appeared to know-was by itself sufficient. 1 51
iv. Tipper and Tippee Liability for Information Coming from within an Institution Other
than the Issuer
Now consider information that comes from within an institution other than the issuer.
148. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d438 (2d Cir. 2014). See infra Part V.A.3 regarding commentary on
the case.
149. Cert. granted, No. 15-628 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016), Salman v. United States, cert. granted (U.S. Jan 19,
2016) (No. 15-628), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Salman-v-US-petition-for-writ-of-
certiorari.pdf.
150. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 420. The language from Newman quoted in the grant of certiorari would appear
to eliminate the gift branch of the test because a gift by definition cannot involve an exchange and yet the quoted
language seems to be requiring one. Yet, it is not clear that this was the intention of the Second Circuit. The very
next sentence after the quoted language says "in other words . . . this requires evidence of 'a relationship between
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the [latter]."
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (quoting United States v. Jau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013)) (emphasis added).
Moreover, a holding eliminating the gift branch of the benefit rule was not a necessary to support the Second
Circuit's decision to reverse the conviction of the defendants in the case because the Second Circuit also
concluded that "[n]o reasonable jury could have found [that the defendants] knew, or deliberately avoided
knowing, that the information originated with corporate insiders." Id. at 455.
151. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428. ("Dirks specifies that when a tipper gives inside information to 'a trading
relative or friend,' the jury can infer that the tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift.") While there
was additional evidence that in fact the tipper intended to help this direct tippee brother, it does not appear there
was evidence that Salman knew anything other than that the two brothers had close relationship (and that the
tippee, in violation of employer's confidentiality requirement, was the source of the information on which Salman
was trading).
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As a first hypothetical, suppose that the source owes a duty to this institution to keep the
information confidential and not trade on it; the recipient has no relationship with either
the institution or the source; and the source willingly, but without authority, provides the
information to the recipient, who trades on it. The source in this hypothetical has violated
Rule 1 Ob-5: the breach of the confidentiality duty is a misappropriation that is in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security because the tip was provided to someone likely to
trade on it. 152 If the recipient is aware of the breach by the source, he too violates Rule
1 Ob-5 as a participant after the fact in the source's breach. 153
As a second hypothetical, suppose again that the source owes a duty to the institution
to keep the information confidential and not to trade on it, and may, or may not, be
authorized to provide it to the recipient. The recipient, who trades on it, has no relationship
with the institution but does have a duty of confidentiality to the source. The trade breaches
this duty and is thus a straightforward Rule lOb-5 violation under the misappropriation
theory. It does not matter whether or not the communication was unauthorized and, if it
was, that the recipient was aware. More remote tippees who trade on the information or tip
themselves may, depending on the particular circumstances, violate Rule lOb-5 based on
various possible combinations and permutations of the participant after the fact and
misappropriation theories as they might be applied to the persons in the chain in a way
similar to these two hypotheticals.
One issue remains unresolved with regard to cases where the misappropriator is not a
trader, but a tipper. Significant disagreement exists among the Circuit Courts concerning
whether the tipping misappropriator must receive a "personal benefit" for there to be a Rule
1 Ob-5 violation, as is required under Dirks for tippers from within the issuer. 154 The Second
Circuit historically did not require that a tipping misappropriator receive a personal benefit
to violate Rule 1Ob-5 and, despite recent dicta going the other way, still has no holding that
a personal benefit is required.15 5 The First Circuit has, in its own words, "dodged the
152. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274-75 (11 th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d
85, 92 (2d Cir. 2011); 18 INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT and PREVENTION § 6:13 (Donald C.
Langevoort ed. 2015).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he government was simply
required to prove a breach by Salvage, the tipper, of a duty owed to the owner of the misappropriated information,
and defendant's knowledge that the tipper had breached the duty.").
154. See SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2000) (reviewing case law but declining to decide the
issue). The issue arose, but was not decided by the Supreme Court, in Salman. The case appears to involve only
information coming from investment banks the clients of which were not the issuers of the shares that were traded.
Thus the alleged Rule I Ob-5 violation would need to be grounded on the misappropriation theory (although the
government maintained it was grounded on the classical theory as well). Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425 n.2. The Court
says "we need not resolve the question [of whether the personal benefit test applies to the misappropriation
theory]", because the parties "do not dispute" that it applies, and so "we will proceed on the assumption that it
does." Id.
155. SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The
misappropriation theory of liability does not require a showing of a benefit to the tipper.") Also, in U.S. v.
Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit focused on whether a marital relationship by itself
created a duty of confidentiality which is breached when the recipient of the information uses it to tip, and made
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question."156 The Eleventh Circuit has held that a personal benefit is required in
misappropriation cases. 157 As discussed below in our evaluation of Rule lOb-5's informed
trading prohibitions, we believe that imposing this added test is doctrinally unnecessary
and leaves a large number of socially undesirable trades beyond Rule 10b-5's
prohibitions.' 58
v. Informed Trading by an Issuer
The prevailing view in the lower courts is that issuers themselves are prohibited under
Rule 1Ob-5 from trading in their shares based on their own nonpublic material information.
The leading case is Shaw v. Digital Equipment Cotp.,159 where the court said "Courts,
including this one, have treated a corporation trading in its own securities as an 'insider'
for purposes of the 'disclose or abstain' rule."160 As discussed earlier, such a prohibition
is good policy.161 The Supreme Court, however, has never addressed this question and the
prohibition is difficult to justify in terms of the Court's doctrinal foundations in this area.
It certainly could not bejustified under the misappropriation theory and it does not fit easily
under the classical theory either. It is a stretch under corporate law to say that the
corporation itself, as opposed to its insiders, owes fiduciary-like duties to its
shareholders. 162
no mention that the recipient needed as well a personal benefit in return for the tip. In a later opinion, the Second
Circuit affirmatively suggested that Chestman supported the notion that the personal benefit was not required for
misappropriation case. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993).
156. United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cir. 2016).
157. SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2003). The court expressed the concern that any insider
tipping case could be reframed as a misappropriation case, instead of a Dirks type classical insider trading case,
thereby rendering the Dirks personal benefit requirement a dead letter. Id. at 1279. Another way that the courts
could deal with this problem, however, would be to rule that the misappropriation theory, which was developed
to deal with a different situation not involving the breach of duties to the persons on the other side of a trade, is
simply not applicable to the issuer insider tipper. See infra Part V.A.1 .b.
158. See infra Section IV.A.3.d.iii. For a detailed discussion of these points and of the history of the case
law to date, see Merritt B. Fox & George Tepe, Insider Trading: Personal Benefit Has No Place in
Misappropriation Tipping Cases, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 25, 2017),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/201 7/07/25/insider-trading-personal-benefit-has-no-place-in-
misappropriation-tipping-cases/#comments.
159. Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 1203. Cf. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 194 (7th Cir. 1978) ("If the corporation were to attempt
to exploit such non-public information [usually involved in insider trading] by dealing in its own securities, it
would open itself up to potential liability under federal and state securities laws, just as do the insiders when they
engage in insider trading."); Arlia ex rel. Massey Energy Co. v. Blankenship, 234 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610 (S.D.W.
Va. 2002) ("[lJnsider trading does not rob the corporation of an opportunity, because securities laws prohibited
the company itself from trading on its own nonpublic information.").
161. See supra Part V.A.2.c.
162. See, e.g., Hyman v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 46 A.D.3d 335, 337 (2007) ("[1]t is well settled that a
corporation does not owe fiduciary duties to its members or shareholders."); Powers v. Ryan, No. CtV. A. 00-
10295-00, 2001 WL 92230, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 2001) ("The case law is less settled on whether a corporation
owes a fiduciary duty to a shareholder."); see also WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC 1. STEINBERG, INSIDER
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2. Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5: Evaluation
How does the reach of Rule lOb-5's prohibitions on informed trading compare with
what the analysis in Part IV suggests are the socially undesirable informed trades?
a. Fundamental Value Informed Trading
We have concluded that fundamental value informed trading is socially desirable.
Consistent with this recommendation, fundamental value informed trading is not
prohibited by Rule 1Ob-5. It is not a violation under the classical theory because there is no
relationship of trust and confidence between a fundamental value informed trader and the
person with whom she transacts. It is also not a violation under the misappropriation theory:
the fundamental value informed trader develops the information herself based on collecting
bits of publicly available information and so there is no breach of a duty of confidentiality
to the information's source as required under that theory.1 63
b. Announcement Information
We concluded in Part IV that announcement informed trading is socially undesirable.,
Announcement trading is not prohibited by Rule 1Ob-5 because it involves trading on
information that is, as a literal matter, publicly available. New law imposing an outright
ban on announcement trading is probably impractical: it would be difficult to define in
legal terms what the reach of the prohibition should be in a way that would actually
diminish the practice without at the same time chilling socially desirable trading. However,
it can be reduced, as discussed below, by rules relating to the structure of market trading
and to the timing of issuer announcements. 164
c. Inside Information: The Issuer as Source
We concluded in Part IV that trades based on material, non-public information from
within an issuer are, as a general matter, socially undesirable. This conclusion includes
trades by the issuer itself and by issuer insiders and their direct and indirect tippees.
Consent from the issuer is irrelevant. As reviewed above, existin interpretations of Rule
1 Ob-5 clearly prohibit such trades by the issuer and its insiders. 16The status of direct and
TRADING § 5.2.3(c)(1) (3d ed. 2010) (discussing issue in depth). In terms of ex post fairness, it should be noted
that unlike trades by insiders, the resulting losses suffered by the shareholders (or shareholders to be) transacting
with the corporation are precisely balanced by the gains of the shareholders who did not transact. See also Donald
C. Langevoort & Gaurang Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 1Ob-5, 57 VAND. L. REv.
1639, 1644-64 (2004) (discussing the distinctive features of issuer insider trading and Shaw).
163. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, J. dissent) (citation omitted).
164. See infra Part V.G.
165. In contrast, we also concluded that trades based on one or more bits of non-public, immaterial
information from within an issuer were not socially undesirable, and existing interpretations of Rule lOb-5 in fact
do not find them illegal.
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indirect tippees is more complex. As we have seen, under Dirks, the Supreme Court finds
some, but not all, selective disclosures of material, non-public information from inside an
issuer to be Rule 1Ob-5 violations, and the same with respect to some, but not all, trades by
outsiders based on these disclosures. For the tip by the insider to be a violation, it must be
a breach of duty to the issuer's shareholders. This requires a violation of the insider's duty
to the corporation to keep the information confidential and, in addition, that the insider
receives a personal benefit. The trade of the outsider recipient is only a violation if it makes
her a "participant after the fact" in the insider's breach. 166 This requires that she be aware
of both the duty of confidentiality violation and the insider's personal benefit. 167
The personal benefit test is an additional wrinkle added by Justice Powell in the Dirks
case, apparently out of a fear of chilling analyst interviews. Our analysis in Part IV makes
us sympathetic with the concern that when the insider tipper receives no personal benefit
for passing on material information to the outsider tippee, imposing liability on either is
likely to chill analyst interviews. The starting point to understanding this concern is to note
that an analyst interview can give rise to either of two bases for profitable trading. One
basis is where the interview reveals a large number of small, immaterial pieces of non-
public information that the analyst can use to develop a superior analysis of a stock's value.
For trades motivated by this basis, the social gain from the resulting price-accuracy
improvements is likely to be greater than the social loss from the decline in liquidity. This
conclusion rests on reasoning identical to the reasoning behind our conclusion in Part IV
that there is a net social gain associated with fundamental value informed trading (which
involves doing the same kind of analysis, but with publicly available or observable
immaterial information bits)168 and behind the same conclusion with trades by insiders
themselves based on non-public, immaterial information. 169
The second basis for an interview generating a trade is the revelation of a piece of
material, non-public information. A trade on this basis would have exactly the same impact
on price accuracy and liquidity as a trade by an insider based on the same information,
which we have concluded involves a net social loss and should be prohibited. Determining
whether or not to punish this second type of interview-generated trades-the socially
undesirable ones based on material information-depends, however, on the effect of such
punishment on the level of the first type of interview-generated trades-the socially
desirable ones based on an analysis of immaterial information. We believe that if analyst
interviews are unfettered by fear of liability (absent a personal benefit to the issuer
spokesperson), there will be many more of them and that there will be a substantial increase
in the first type of trades and only a modest increase in the second type of trades. This is
because the protection arising from a lack of personal benefit only extends to unauthorized
166. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
167. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (directing courts to look to "whether the insider receives a
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will
translate into future earnings").
168. See supra Part IV.A.4.b (comparing costs and benefits of fundamental value informed trading).
169. See supra Part IV.C.4.b (discussing insider trading on small bits of non-public information).
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disclosures,170 and so they likely only occur by accident.171 Thus, we think that with
unfettered interviews, the net social gains from trades motivated by the first basis will be
greater than net social losses from trades motivated by the second basis. This said, using a
personal benefit test of some kind is best paired with a provision, such as Regulation FD
discussed later in Part V, that in essence prohibits a firm from the intentional selective
disclosure of material information when it is likely to be traded upon, and requires
immediate public disclosure of such information if the firm discovers an inadvertent
selective disclosure of such information.
The current law's imposition of the personal benefit test in tipper/tippee cases is one
way of engaging in the doctrinal gymnastics of converting, as best one can, an anti-fraud
rule into a policy-based regulation of informed trading capable of protecting analyst
interviews. If the only choices were to retain or to eliminate the test, we would choose to
retain it for this reason. As analyzed in the discussion below concerning the way forward
under Rule 1 Ob-5, however, we believe that the test too often provides defenses for indirect
tippees trading on such information-trades that are just as socially undesirable as ones by
an insider based on the same information. We will advocate an approach that presents much
less of this problem, while still not chilling analyst interviews and continuing to respect the
doctrinal foundations laid down by Supreme Court in Chiarella.172
d. Inside Information: A Non-issuer Source
Now consider material nonpublic information relevant to predicting the future cash
flows paid to the holders of an issuer's shares that comes from within an institution other
than the issuer. We concluded in Part IV that trading based on such information is socially
undesirable, but, unlike trading based on information from within the issuer, only when the
source-the non-issuer institution-has failed to give permission. The reach of Rule 1Ob-
5's prohibitions on trades based on such information generally includes the trades we
believe are socially undesirable and leaves untouched the socially desirable ones. Again,
the one problematic area relates to tippers and tippees, especially indirect tippees.
170. An authorized selective disclosure of material information raises very different issues. The prevailing
view of the lower courts is that trading by an issuer when in possession of such information would violate Rule
I Ob-5. See supra Part V.A. I.b.v (explaining informed trading by an issuer). By logical extension, it would
presumably also be the view of these courts that the issuer would also violate Rule I Ob-5 if its agent made an
authorized tip of such information, as would a trade by its direct tippee or any indirect tippees if the trader were
aware that the tip was authorized.
171. Moreover, the issuer has an interest in preventing such accidents because the resulting effect on liquidity
will lower its share price. Admittedly, there is the possibility that the firm, while not formally authorizing the
disclosure, would wink at its agent providing the occasional material tip in return for either continued analyst
coverage where there otherwise would not be any, or for more favorable coverage. Whether tips in return for
analyst coverage are socially undesirable requires its own complex analysis, as does calculating the likelihood of
tips in return for favorable coverage. See infra Part V.D.2 (discussing "Reg. FD").
172. See infra Part V.C.3.b (discussing the process involving public announcements of generated
information).
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Under the misappropriation theory approved by the Supreme Court's majority opinion
in O'Hagan, trading on non-public material information originating from an institution
other than the issuer violates Rule lOb-5 when the trade involves a breach of a duty of
confidentiality.1 73 Thus, where an insider of the institution, with its permission, trades or
provides the information to others, there is no violation because there is no breach of the
duty of confidentiality. Similarly, where an authorized agent of the institution provides
such information to an outside recipient who trades on it or passes it on to others to trade
on, there is no Rule 1Ob-5 violation because there is no breach by the insider with respect
to which the recipient could be a participant after the fact. The exception to this would be
where the outside recipient agreed to keep the information confidential or is otherwise in a
relationship with the institution imposing a duty of confidentiality, circumstances that
would impose liability without reliance on the participant after the fact theory.
While we approve of the results in the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan
affirming the misappropriation theory, the majority opinion justified the decision in part
by saying that the prohibited trades are harmful to others in the market. 174 This justification
is incoherent because trades based on the same information that are approved by the non-
issuer institution are equally harmful to others in the market. Yet, these trades do not violate
Rule 1Ob-5 under the misappropriation theory, a point made forcefully by Justice Thomas
in dissent.175 The analysis here provides an alternative, more coherent justification for the
distinction between the transactions prohibited by the theory and those that are not. Each
of these two kinds of trades-by decreasing liquidity-causes the same amount of harm to
other market participants. The trades prohibited by the theory discourage production of and
trading upon fundamental value information, whereas the permitted transactions encourage
these socially valuable activities.
To start the analysis of tippers and tippees under the misappropriation theory, consider
information originating from an institution other than the issuer that, without the
institution's authority, is selectively disclosed by one of its insiders or by a person owing
the institution a duty of confidentiality. Assume also that trading by a recipient upon the
information is predictable and that the direct or indirect recipient who trades on it owes no
duty of confidentiality to the institution or to any person in the chain through which it
reached him.
173. Under O'Hagan, the only exception would be in the surreal situation where the insider, just in advance
of breaching her duty of confidentiality to her employer, informs the employer of her intention to do so. See
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997) (laying out the exception to breaching duty of
confidentiality). This is because the Court requires deceit for a trade to violate Rule lOb-5, but includes within
the reach of what it understands as deceit the situation where an insider breaches her duty of confidentiality
without affirmatively telling her employer that she is doing so.
174. Id. at 655, 657 (a misappropriator's trades harm members of the investing public).
175. Justice Thomas, in dissent, points to this incoherence to conclude that such trading should not violate
Rule 1Ob-5 whether or not the trader has permission. Id. at 680, 689-90 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (whether a trade
is based on "disclosed misuse or authorized use [of information]-the hypothesized 'inhibiting impact on market
participation,' would be identical to that from behavior violating the misappropriation theory") (citation omitted).
872 [Vol. 43:4
Informed Trading and Its Regulation
As analyzed in Part IV, the prospect of such trades reduces the incentives of outside
institutions to produce such socially useful information. Such trades are thus socially
undesirable.176 An optimal rule would prohibit any such trade where the trader knows, or
should know, that the information was confidential, came originally from within the
institution, and was selectively disclosed by an insider without the institution's authority.
This optimal rule should not pose a challenge to the Supreme Court's Rule 1 Ob-5 doctrinal
foundations. The insider's original disclosure of the information without authority violates
Rule lOb-5 under the "misappropriation theory" because it involves a breach of a duty of
confidentiality in connection with a predictable purchase or sale of a security. The trade
makes the trader with this knowledge a "participant after the fact."l77
As noted above-however-there is disagreement among the circuits whereby some
courts have sought to add the personal benefit test as an additional requirement, a test that
was originally developed for issuer insider tippers.178 We think that inserting the personal
benefit test into the misappropriation theory is seriously misguided as a matter of both
policy and doctrine. The central factual issue under the misappropriation theory is whether
the insider of the non-issuer institution breached a duty of confidentiality to it by tipping
or trading. Where he has, it means that the institution has not waived this duty when it
could have. This institution finds the insider's conduct disadvantageous whether or not the
insider benefited personally and so allowing trading when there is no personal benefit is
just as harmful to the incentives to do fundamental value research as when there is personal
benefit. The Supreme Court added the personal benefit requirement in Dirks for a policy
reason that is inapplicable to non-issuer-information cases, i.e., fear that analyst interviews
will otherwise be chilled. Insiders of companies considering hostile takeovers, financial
printers, law firms, or investment banking firms do not give socially valuable interviews to
market analysts about the future prospects of companies about which they have knowledge,
nor does a spouse sharing a confidence with her mate. Adding the personal benefit test
leaves many socially undesirable trades beyond the reach of Rule 1Ob-5's prohibitions for
no good reason.
B. The Way Forward Under Rule 1Ob-5
Overall, the current reach of Rule lOb-5 conforms reasonably closely with what is
recommended in Part IV. Fundamental value informed trading-which we find socially
desirable-is permitted. Announcement trading-which we find undesirable-is also
permitted, but we do not believe that an outright prohibition is the best way of dealing with
announcement trading. Rule lOb-5's current reach prohibits trading by issuer insiders
based on material nonpublic information from within the issuer. This is consistent with our
findings that such trades are on average socially undesirable and that it is not
administratively practical to distinguish the desirable from the undesirable trades based on
the nature of the information, the timing of the trade, or the issuer's particular
176. See supra Part IV.D.2.
177. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980) (discussing how the "[t]he tippee's obligation
has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty").
178. See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text (discussing the personal benefit test).
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circumstances. The current reach of Rule 1Ob-5 permits trades by issuer insiders based on
immaterial nonpublic information from inside the issuer, trades which we find on average
to be socially desirable. We also find to be socially undesirable unauthorized trading in an
issuer's shares by an insider of an entity other than the issuer based on material nonpublic
information from within that entity. This trading too is prohibited under Rule lOb-5's
current reach.
The one problematic area with respect to the regulation of trading based on both types
of inside information is the current law's application of Rule 1 Ob-5 to tippers and tippees.
In terms of its direct impact on liquidity and price accuracy, a trade by a tippee, whether
direct or indirect, is just as socially desirable as if the trade were instead undertaken by the
insider herself. Ideally, then, there should be a blanket prohibition on all tippee trades-
and the tipping the led to them-where the trade would have been prohibited if instead the
inside tipper herself had been the trader.179 The one exception would be a trade by an
analyst-or the entity that employs him-who receives material non-public information in
an interview with an insider where granting the overall interview is within the insider's
authority but not the disclosure of the particular piece of non-public information. Although
such a trade is just as socially undesirable as if the insider had made it, we concluded above
that it should be shielded from punishment in order to avoid chilling analyst interviews. 8 0
Rule 1 Ob-5's prohibitions on tippee trading, based on current court interpretations,
fall well short of this ideal. As for trading by outsiders based on information originating
from within the issuer, the personal benefit rule protects from punishment far more such
trades than need to be protected in order to achieve the goal of avoiding chilling of analyst
interviews. As for trading by outsiders based on information originating from within an
entity other than the issuer, courts have been increasingly inserting the personal benefit
rule in determining whether there has been a Rule 1Ob-5 violation. Doing so is not justified
for policy reasons because punishing such trades would in no way chill analyst interviews.
These existing interpretations of Rule 1 Ob-5 are not written in stone, however. They are
the product of a common law process that will continue to evolve. The challenge going
forward is to shape the law's future evolution in a direction that comes as close as possible
to the ideal set out above, while also paying due deference to the process's doctrinal roots.
1. Problems with the Existing Law Concerning Trading by Outsiders Based on
Information Originating from within the Issuer of the Traded Shares
We have seen that under existing case law, a person outside of an issuer who trades
on the basis of material non-public information originating from within the traded shares'
issuer cannot be found in violation of Rule 1Ob-5 unless the government or other plaintiff
179. There should be evidence also that the tippee knows, or has good reason to believe, that the information
came from an insider source.
180. See supra Part V.A. 1.b.iii
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can show that the trader knew both that, (1) the insider source, in communicating the
information to someone outside the issuer, breached her duty to the issuer to keep the
information confidential, and (2) the insider source received a personal benefit from doing
SO.181
This requirement to show personal benefit will usually not pose a significant obstacle
for the government or other plaintiff to establish a Rule lob-5 violation in cases where
there is in fact such a personal benefit and it takes the form of a gift. However, it poses a
more significant obstacle where the benefit instead takes the form of a quid pro quo,
especially in cases against indirect tippees.
a. Personal Benefit in the Form of a Gift
Where the insider tipper did in fact enjoy a personal benefit but it was in the form of
making a gift to the direct tippee, the government or other plaintiff will usually not have
much difficulty making the required showing of this fact. This is likely the case whether
the defendant is the direct tippee or an indirect tippee.
Consider first a case against a direct tippee. In Salman, the Supreme Court decided
that evidence of the existence of a close family or friendship relationship is, by itself,
sufficient for a jury to infer that the insider tipper was making a gift of a kind that satisfies
the personal benefit test.182 Because people do not tend to do random acts of kindness,
most gift cases presumably involve such a relationship. Where such a relationship exists
and the case is against the initial tippee, the tippee would obviously be aware of the
relationship because he would be a party to it. So, simply showing the existence of the
relationship should, under Salman, be sufficient to show the outsider recipient's knowledge
of the gift and hence that the insider's personal benefit.
Things should not be a great deal more difficult for the government or other plaintiff
where the action is instead against an indirect tippee, and where, again, the insider tipper,
and the initial tippee have a close family or friendship relationship. Any indirect tippee
who knows enough to have good reason to believe that the information's original source
was an insider and that the information is reliable would be unlikely to have come to these
conclusions without also knowing about the existence of the relationship between the
insider and the initial tippee.183 And, again, evidence that the indirect tippee knew of this
relationship is sufficient under Salman to show the indirect tippee's knowledge that the
insider's tip was a gift and hence the insider enjoyed a personal benefit.
181. See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing violations of Rule 10b-5 under current law). This assumes that there
was no independent basis for the tippee to owe a duty of confidentiality to the issuers.
182. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
183. If the indirect tippee cannot reliably determine that the information is reliable and from an insider
source, a Rule 1Ob-5 violation is unlikely in any event. Materiality is a necessary element for a Rule 1Ob-5 insider
trading violation. The materiality of a rumor depends in part on "it[s] reliability in light of its nature and source
and the circumstances under which it was received." In Re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 SEC 633, 670
(1971).
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b. Personal Benefit in the Form of a Quid Pro Quo
Now consider the situation where the insider tipper enjoyed a personal benefit, but it
was in the form of a quid pro quo-such as the sharing of profits with the direct tippee or
the prospect of reciprocal tips. The government or other plaintiff will often have much
more trouble making the required showing of a personal benefit. If the defendant is the
direct tippee, she would clearly be aware of the benefit that she conferred upon the insider,
but evidence establishing that she gave such a benefit is often hard for the government or
other plaintiff to obtain. The problem is compounded in the case of an indirect tippee. Not
only does the government or other plaintiff need to find sufficient evidence that the direct
tippee provided the tipper with a quid pro quo, it must show that the indirect tippee had
actual knowledge of this fact. This will not be possible in many cases. It is again true the
tip is unlikely to impel the indirect tippee to trade unless he has good reason to believe the
information's original source is an insider and that the information is reliable. The indirect
tippee, however, can easily acquire sufficient facts to come to these conclusions without
acquiring any facts specifying that the insider received a quid pro quo from the initial
tippee.
c. An Alternative Approach to Outsiders Trading on Information Originating from Within
the Issuer
To solve the problems described immediately above, we propose an alternative
approach that involves a reversal of the evidentiary burden concerning personal benefit.
Relative to the current court interpretations of Rule 1Ob-5, this alternative will likely make
subject to punishment many more trades by direct and indirect tippees based on material
non-public information coming from within the issuer. Hence it should deter far more such
trades from occurring. Yet, it would be equally protective of analyst interviews as is current
law. And it would be equally consistent as current law with the doctrinal foundations laid
out in Chiarella concerning the application of Rule 1 Ob-5 to informed trading.
d. The Substance of the Alternative Approach: The Insider Tipper and the Direct Tippee
Under the alternative approach, the insider source would be found to violate Rule lOb-
5 if she disclosed to an outsider non-public material information likely to be traded upon
unless the insider provides persuasive evidence that the reason she did so was not for a
Dirks-type personal benefit. Similarly, if the direct tippee knows, or has good reason to
believe, that the information came from an insider source and trades on the information (or
tips it to someone else likely to trade on it), he would be found to have violated Rule 1Ob-
5 unless he provides the same kind of persuasive evidence that the insider tipper had a non-
personal-benefit reason for disclosing.
When an issuer insider makes a selective disclosure to an outsider of material non-
public information that she can expect will be traded upon, some reason motivates the
disclosure. Four possible reasons largely exhaust the possibilities. Three relate to the
disclosure of information that issuer deemed should be kept confidential: (1) an expectation
of a quid pro quo; (2) an intention to benefit the outsider initial recipient; and (3) any other
motivator for the insider to disclose the information despite the issuer deeming that it be
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kept confidential. A fourth possible reason is that the issuer determined that information
should be selectively disclosed to a person likely to trade on it and insider conveying the
information to the outsider was simply the issuer's authorized agent for doing so. The
rationale for our proposed alternative approach will become clear as we consider how this
approach would work in connection with disclosures made for each of these four reasons.
i. Trades Based on Tips Made for Personal Benefit Reasons
Suppose that the tipper's disclosure was in fact motivated by one of the first two
reasons: the expectation of a quid pro quo or the tipper's intention to benefit the tippee. If
all the facts were known to the parties at the time of the tip, and to the court later on, the
insider tipper and the initial tippee would clearly be found to have violated Rule lOb-5.185
As we have seen, the problem under existing law is that it is often going to be very difficult
for the government or other plaintiff to find affirmative evidence that the insider tipper
enjoyed a personal benefit, at least where it takes the quid pro quo form. Under the
proposed alternative approach, however, it will be much easier for the government or other
plaintiff to successfully prosecute a Rule lOb-5 case against the tipper and direct tippee.
This is because each would have great difficulty affirmatively producing convincing
evidence that the reason for the initial source's disclosure was not for one of these first two
reasons when in fact it was. Thus, under the alternative approach proposed here, personal
benefit considerations would be much less likely to obstruct punishment of persons
involved in a transaction that was in fact motivated by one of the first two reasons. This is
a transaction that would be found to violate Rule lOb-5 under current law if all the facts
were known and that our analysis in Part IV suggests is socially undesirable.
ii. Trades Based on the Unauthorized Selective Disclosure of Information for Reasons
Other than Personal Benefit
Now consider the situation where the disclosure was motivated by the third type of
184. Note the distinction between the third and fourth reasons. Neither involves the insider tipper enjoying
a personal benefit. In the fourth, however, the selective disclosure of confidential material information has been
authorized by the issuer. Disclosures for the third reason typically occur within the context of analyst interviews.
So, in contrast to disclosures for the fourth reason, the selective disclosure of the particular information at issue
was not authorized even though the conversation within which the disclosure occurs was. The non-personal-
benefit reason that the insider tipper disclosed information she is supposed to keep confidential would most often
be that she mistakenly believes either that the information is immaterial or is already public. The Dirks case itself
provides a very unusual example of an unauthorized tip where there is no personal benefit: to reveal publicly a
fraud within the corporation. If this, or some other unusual but meritorious motivation, were the reason, the source
should be able to provide evidence to this effect and thus, appropriately, would not be found to violate Rule lOb-
5.
185. In trades motivated by one of the first two reasons, the facts, if known, would establish the personal
benefit required by Dirks and so there would be a Rule 1Ob-5 violation. In the trade motivated by the fourth
reason, there would be no personal benefit, but the tipper would nevertheless be participating in the Rule lOb-5
violation.
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reason: any motivator for making an unauthorized selective disclosure of material non-
public information other than for personal benefit. The most common example would be
where the recipient is an analyst and that the disclosure occurs during an interview, facts
easy for both the insider source and the direct recipient to establish. Absent anything to the
contrary, this evidence would be sufficient to establish the absence of personal benefit.
Thus, in this situation, the alternative approach would protect both the insider tipper and
direct tippee from being found to have violated Rule 1 Ob-5, the same result as under current
law. In other words, our proposed alternative approach would be just as effective at
protecting analyst interviews-the concern that prompted shielding from Rule 1Ob-5
punishment trades of trades motivated by the third reason-while making it much easier to
prosecute cases involving trades based on tips made for either of the first two reasons, i.e.,
ones which would be found to have violated Rule lOb-5 if all the facts were known. 186
iii. Trades Based on Authorized Selective Disclosure
Finally, consider trades motivated by the fourth reason: a selective disclosure of
material non-public information to someone likely to trade on the information where the
disclosure is authorized by the issuer. The individual insider making the disclosure could
very well be making the disclosure without personal benefit. If so and the disclosure occurs
within the context of an analyst interview, both the insider tipper and the direct tippee will
again almost certainly be in possession of, and able to introduce, persuasive evidence to
this effect. Therefore an absence of personal benefit will be presumed. However, recall, as
noted earlier in this Article, that existing case law and commentary suggest that Rule 1 Ob-
5 is violated when an issuer trades in its own shares based on material non-public
information that it possesses. They suggest a violation as well when the issuer tips this
information to an outsider likely to trade on it, who in turn can be liable as a participant
after the fact in the issuer's violation. Thus, the issuer and the tippee trader would be found
to violate Rule lOb-5 if all the facts were known, as would the individual tipper in his
actions as the agent of the issuer. The proof problem here for the government or other
plaintiff does not relate to personal benefit. It relates to demonstrating that the tip was
authorized and, for the action against the direct tippee, that the tippee was aware of this
fact.
e. The Substance of the Alternative Approach: The Indirect Tippee
What, though, about an indirect tippee? Where disclosure by the insider tippee is made
for one of the first two reasons, the indirect tippee is in very much the same position as the
direct tippee: she will have great difficulty affirmatively producing convincing evidence
that the reason for the initial source's disclosure was not for one of these first two reasons
when in fact it was.
186. Where the analyst does not trade herself, but makes a private recommendation based on a professional
relationship with the actual trader, it is socially undesirable to punish the actual trader's trade because doing so
would chill analyst interviews. This relationship means, however, that the analyst would likely provide the actual
trader with the evidence needed under the alternative approach to protect her from punishment.
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Where the disclosure is made for the third reason, the indirect tippee is in a different
position than the direct tippee. Unlike the direct tippee, she might well not be able to
provide evidence that the disclosure was for the third reason when in fact it was. Thus,
under the proposed alternative approach, the indirect tippee of such a disclosure might well
be found to violate Rule 1Ob-5. This result, however, is good from a policy point of view.
The indirect tippee's trade is just as socially undesirable as if the insider tipper had traded
on the information himself. And, unlike punishing the insider tipper or direct tippee when
the disclosure is made for the third reason, punishing the indirect tippee for trading on the
same disclosure will not chill analyst interviews. This is because the indirect tippee is not
a party to such an interview. This result also does not create any serious doctrinal problems.
Given the available evidence, it would be assumed under the proposed alternative approach
that the initial tipper either enjoyed a personal benefit, or was authorized to make the
selective disclosure to someone likely to trade on it and hence was participating in the
issuer's illegal tipping. Whichever it is, the insider tipper would be assumed to have
violated Rule 1 Ob-5 and the indirect tippee would be assumed to know of the violation.
This would allow the indirect tippee to be considered a participant after the fact to a Rule
lOb-5 type breach by the insider source.187
Where the disclosure is made for the fourth reason, again the indirect tippee might be
unable to provide evidence suggesting an absence of personal benefit even when in fact
there was not one. Thus, under the proposed alternative approach, this indirect tippee might
well be found to violate Rule 1 Ob-5 even though the government or other plaintiff offered
no evidence that the tip was authorized and that the indirect tippee knew that it was
authorized. Again, however, it is not unfortunate that the indirect tippee is found to have
violated Rule 1Ob-5. The indirect tippee's trade is socially undesirable and there is no
reason to protect him from punishment in order to avoid chilling analyst interviews. It
would be evidently illegal if all the facts were actually known.
f Implementation
As discussed earlier, a tippee trade does not fit in easily under the classical theory first
articulated by Justice Powell in his opinion in Chiarella.188 The problem is that the tippee
does not have the theory's required relationship of trust and confidence with the
counterparty to his trade.189 In the same opinion, however, Justice Powell, in dicta,
suggested a solution to this problem by saying that the tippee could be considered a
187. Despite the policy desirability of punishing the indirect tippee's trade, if he can provide evidence that
the initial disclosure was motivated by the third reason, he would not be found under the proposed alternative
approach to have violated Rule lOb-5. This is because it would then be possible for the indirect tippee to establish
that the insider source did not commit a Rule I Ob-5 type breach. So, there would be no finding of a breach in
which the indirect tippee could be a participant after the fact.
188. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
189. Id. at 223.
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"participant after the fact" to the tipper's breach of fiduciary duty. 190 Powell's Chiarella
opinion makes no mention of the insider needing to have enjoyed a personal benefit for
there to be a breach of his fiduciary duty when he makes an unauthorized selective
disclosure of material non-public information to someone likely to trade on it.1 9 1 Nor does
it make mention of the tippee needing be aware of such a benefit. 192 The authorities cited
by Powell also make no mention of requiring that the tipper enjoy a personal benefit or that
the tippee be aware of the benefit. Powell's policy concern in Chiarella is with the
unfairness of the ex post loss suffered by others trading on unfavorable terms because the
insider breached his duty to keep the information confidential. 193 This loss is just as present
whether the insider enjoyed a personal benefit or not. The idea of imposing a personal
benefit test does not appear in the law until three years later in Powell's opinion in Dirks.194
There, after expressing concern that analyst interviews could be chilled unless both the
insider representative of the issuer and the analyst were protected from liability, Powell
holds that the insider must enjoy a personal benefit for there to be a violation. 195
Against this background, how could the law evolve to implement the alternative
approach's reversal of the evidentiary burden? The more modest way would be for the
courts to establish a rebuttable presumption that an insider who is making an unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information is receiving a personal benefit. Again, the rationale
for such a presumption is straightforward. A significant portion of such disclosures involve
a personal benefit. And it is easier for the insider source and original outside recipient to
come up with evidence that the insider disclosed for a non-personal-benefit reason when
this is the case, than it is for the government or a private plaintiff to come up with evidence
that the reason for the disclosure was personal benefit when that is the case.
Implementing the alternative approach by creating a presumption of personal benefit
has the advantage of being just an evidentiary rule based on its own internal logic. Thus, it
does not involve a direct challenge to the Supreme Court's earlier holding in Dirks. This
route to implementation has the important disadvantage, however, that the law governing
criminal procedure generally disfavors use of a presumption in criminal cases.19
The more ambitious route to implementation is for the Supreme Court, or Congress,
to directly revise the holding in Dirks in accordance with the alternative approach proposed
here. Revising the Dirks holding in this way is supported by sound reasoning. The revision
190. Id. at 230 n.12 (citations omitted).
191. See generally id.
192. See generally id.
193. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
194. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 326-27 (1985) (reversing conviction based on jury
instruction imposing presumption); Sandstrom v. Mont., 442 U.S. 510, 510 (1979) (holding a jury instruction
creating a presumption is unconstitutional). Still, the combination of civil remedies available to the govemment
and private damages suits are sufficiently threatening to create a significant deterrent. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)
(2015) (authorizing various forms of SEC penalties and remedies).
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is as plausible an outgrowth of the foundational Chiarella decision as is approach dictated
by the holding in Dirks. It would be as effective as the Dirks holding in avoiding chilling
analyst interviews, which was the reason for adding the personal benefit test in the first
place. And it has the advantage of making it less difficult to establish a Rule lOb-5 violation
in both civil and criminal cases against direct and indirect tippees. 197
g. Trading by Outsiders on the Basis ofNon-public Information Originating within Non-
issuer Institutions
As discussed earlier, there is currently legal uncertainty as to whether the personal
benefit test applies just to tipping cases based on the classical theory of insider trading,
where it was originally developed, or whether it extends as well to tipping cases based on
the misappropriation theory. The key distinction between the two theories is that the
classical theory deals only with cases involving information coming from inside the issuer
whose shares are being traded, whereas the misappropriation theory was developed to deal
with cases involving information coming from within an institution other than the issuer.
As also discussed earlier, there are both strong policy and strong doctrinal reasons to
conclude that the test should not extend to cases based on the misappropriation theory. 199
Here the way forward is simple. The Supreme Court, or some developing consensus among
the lower courts, simply needs to make clear that the personal benefit test should be
confined to cases based on the classical theory.
C. Use of the Martin Act Regulation to Stop Informed Trading
Many states also have anti-fraud securities laws, but they have not historically been a
potent source of prohibitions on informed trading. New York Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman's recent use of the state's Martin Act is an exception.200 As detailed below,
Schneiderman recently shut down Thompson Reuters' practice of privately providing to
select traders the latest results of the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey moments in
197. An even more ambitious revision would be to make the alternative approach applicable only to the
insider source and his initial outside recipient and to deny the affirmative defense to any indirect tippee. This
would bring the reach of Rule lOb-5's prohibitions closer to the ideal set out in Part IV, but would begin to be in
tension with the doctrinal roots found in Chiarella.
198. See supra Part V.A. I.b.iv (discussing tipper and tippee liability when information is not derived from
the issuer).
199. See supra Part V.A.2.d. (discussing when the tippee and tipper do not belong to the issuing institution).
200. The Martin Act prohibits "any fraud, deception, concealment, suppression [or] false pretense" in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-c (1982). It has been interpreted
as banning "all deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty" including "all acts . .. which
do by their tendency ... deceive or mislead the purchasing public." People v. Federated Radio, 154 N.E. 655,
656-57 (N.Y. 1926).
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advance of announcing the results publicly,201 condemning it as "Insider Trading 2.0"202
Under the same banner, he persuaded BlackRock, the largest asset manager worldwide, to
stop surveying the opinions of financial analysts prior to the analysts publishing their
reports.203 This use of state law to extend the range of prohibitions on informed trading to
cover these practices is ill advised in our view.
1. Practices Not Prohibited by Rule JOb-5
The practice of a non-issuer institution privately providing select traders with
information in advance of its public announcement is clearly not prohibited by Rule 1 Ob-5
because it does not fit under either of the classical theory or the misappropriation theory.
Neither the information generating institution nor the select traders have a relationship of
trust and confidence with the counterparties to the traders' trades and a subsequent public
announcement does not change this fact. So failing to provide the information to these
counterparties breaches no duty to them, as required under the classical theory.204 The
institution voluntarily gives the information to the select persons to trade upon. So they do
not, by trading, deceptively breach a duty of confidentiality to the source of their
information, as required under the alternative misappropriation theory. 205
2. The Successfid Martin Act Campaign Against "Insider Trading 2.0."
Notwithstanding the legality under federal law of Thompson Reuters tipping select
traders in advance of its public announcement of the Consumer Sentiment Survey,
Schneiderman, through the use of the Martin Act's investigatory powers, was able to stop
the practice without even filing a complaint.206 The Attorney General terminated his
201. Thompson Reuters in turn had purchased distribution rights to these results from the developers of the
survey. See generally Hu et al., supra note 27.
202. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Secures Agreement By
Thomson Reuters To Stop Offering Early Access To Market-Moving Information (July 8, 2013),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-agreement-thomson-reuters-stop-offering-early-
access-market.
203. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces
Agreement With BlackRock To End Its Analyst Survey Program Worldwide (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-agreement-blackrock-end-its-analyst-survey-
program-worldwide (noting that analyst survey was considered the world's largest).
204. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 135-141 and accompanying text.
206. Moreover, broad as the Martin Act's actual language and court interpretations of this language are, it is
hard to argue that a non-issuer institution violates the Act simply by staying silent at the time that it provides
information to select traders and then, after these traders have a chance to trade, announcing the information
publicly. See supra note 200. Still one cannot rule out the possibility that the Attorney General could have
persuaded a court to find a violation if he were able to show that the investing public clearly assumed no trader
was receiving the information in advance of its public announcement. This possibility was not tested, however.
The Attorney General was ultimately able to obtain the agreement of Thompson Reuters and Bloomberg not to
engage in the practice in the future simply by issuing it them a subpoena, a procedure that does not require him
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investigation of Thompson Reuters (and later BlackRock) when each agreed not to engage
in this practice in the future.20 7
3. Evaluation
The Thompson Reuters affair involved an ill-advised use of the Attorney General's
investigatory power under the Martin Act. As set out below, a simple extension of our
analysis in Part IV shows that the practice of a non-issuer institution privately providing
select traders with information in advance of its public announcement is unlikely to be
socially undesirable. 208 Indeed, it appears that allowing such informed trading is socially
positive, though probably just modestly. Thus, the absence of a federal prohibition on this
practice gets things right, and it was ill advised to use the investigatory powers under New
York's Martin Act's to stop "Insider Trading 2.0."
a. Possible Uses by Outsiders of the Information They Generate about Issuers
The starting point for the analysis is to note that a non-issuer institution that has
generated information of value for assessing an issuer's stock (or has purchased it, directly
or indirectly, from a person that has generated it) can use this information in three possible
ways: (1) trade on the information; (2) provide it privately to certain other traders; or (3)
announce the information publicly. As discussed, we view it as socially desirable to allow
such an institution to use the information in the first or second way or in a combination of
the two.209 This is based on our conclusion that the social gains from the resulting
additional incentives for non-issuer institutions to generate price-accuracy-enhancing
information outweigh the social losses in terms of real resources needed to generate the
information and the increase in informed trading's negative impact on liquidity.2 10
or her to provide a coherent explanation, subject to court review, of how the available evidence suggests the real
possibility of a violation. This is because the Martin Act gives the Attorney General the power to issue such a
subpoena on his or her own initiative. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW ART. 23-A, §352 (1960). Thus, to get the subpoena,
he or she is not required, unlike in an ordinary criminal proceeding, to get a court order by showing probable
cause or to convene a court supervised grand jury, or, unlike in a civil action, to file a complaint that is subject to
court review pursuant to a defendant's motion to dismiss.
207. Id.
208. If, in contrast, the non-issuer institution affirmatively misleads the public into believing that it is not
engaging in the practice, the practice would be socially undesirable because it might result in prices being
temporally distorted by the announcement given that investors would not understand that the price at that moment
already reflected the information. Such an affirmative statement misleading the public, however, would also
violate Rule I Ob-5, which prohibits, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, "mak[ing] any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
209. See infra Part V.A.2.d.
210. Id.
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b. Using Generated Information to make a Public Announcement
If this reasoning concerning the first and second uses of the information is correct, the
third use-publicly announcing the information-must also be socially desirable. A non-
issuer institution that contemplates this third use presumably incurs the expense of
generating or obtaining the information because it expects to be compensated by the
goodwill or enhanced reputation that results from the information's public
announcement.211 So, allowing public announcement of this information provides a
desirable additional incentive. As with allowing the institution to trade on the information
itself or to sell it privately to others to trade upon, there is also a liquidity-decreasing
downside to allowing its public announcement, in this case from the trade of announcement
traders. This negative impact on liquidity, however, is certainly no greater than if the
institution had instead just traded on the information, a practice which we have concluded
on balance should be allowable. 2 12
c. Combining Providing the Information to Select Traders Privately with Subsequently
Announcing It Publicly
Finally, if, as we conclude here, each of these three uses of a piece of information
should be allowable on its own, there is nothing in the logic justifying each of these uses
that suggests that they suddenly become toxic when two or more are combined, including
the combination of providing the information privately to select persons to trade and
announcing it publicly thereafter.
D. The Broad Scale Legislative Approach to Informed Trading Prohibitions
A broad scale legislative approach is an alternative to the scheme of informed trading
prohibitions developed in a common law fashion through court interpretations of 1Ob-5.
Two such legislative approaches will be considered: the EU's longstanding Market Abuse
Directive213 and the proposed Insider Trading Prohibition Act214 recently introduced in
Congress. Each corrects for some of the shortcomings of the prevailing U.S. Rule lOb-5
211. See supra Part IV.D.1 and accompanying text.
212. The negative impact on liquidity in fact would most likely be much less than if the institution traded on
the information. Announcement traders have much less time to trade (a period measured at most in seconds) than
would the institution (a period measured probably in days) and so they cannot extract nearly as much profit from
their informed trading than the institution could trading itself. Less profit means less impact on liquidity because
liquidity suppliers, in their setting of the bid ask spread, need to protect themselves less.
213. See Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC) 7 [hereinafter "Council Directive"]. The
Directive has recently morphed into an EU regulation that includes the same substantive prohibitions discussed
here, but with an expanded reach that covers additional instruments and trading occurring on unregulated venues.
For background information on this development, see Davis Polk, The New EU Market Abuse Regulation: Key
Issues for US. Investors (June 15, 2016), available at https://www.davispolk.com/files/2016-6-
15_NewEU MAR Key_ Issues_US_1ssuers.pdf
214. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
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scheme, but neither includes within the reach the full set of informed trades that optimally
should be prohibited. Moreover, the Market Abuse Directive calls for prohibiting some
informed trades that optimally should be allowed. Ultimately, we conclude that it would
be better for the United States to continue to use the current Rule 1Ob-5 regime and adopt
only narrowly crafted legislation to fill in some of its holes.
1. EU Market Abuse Directive
The EU Market Abuse Directive (the "Directive") directs member countries to
prohibit a wide range of persons215 from trading on the basis of, or tipping, "inside
information," which is defined as information relating to an issuer that is "of a precise
nature which has not been made public ... and which, if it were made public, would be
likely to have a significant effect on" the price of the issuer's securities. 216 Thus, this
approach does not depend on the existence of any relationship of trust and confidence or
duty of confidentiality and does not differentiate between information coming from within
the issuer and from within a non-issuer institution. While, on the surface, the Directive
looks like it calls for a "parity of information" approach that goes beyond even Justice
Blackmun's structural access theory in his dissent in Chiarella, a closer look reveals that
it, in fact, excepts from its prohibitions a variety of kinds of informed trading.
a. Fundamental Value, Announcement, and Issuer Insider Informed Trading
The Directive appears to reach so broadly that it would prohibit all fundamental value
informed trading based on information of significance, but a "whereas clause" clarifies that
"research and estimates developed from publicly available data should not be regarded as
inside information."217 Like Rule 1Ob-5, the Directive appears to permit announcement
trading because "inside information" includes only information "not made public."218 Also
like Rule 1Ob-5, it prohibits issuer insiders from trading on material non-public information
from inside the issuer,219 but permits them to trade on immaterial information from this
source.220 Thus, in these regards, the Directive, like Rule 1Ob-5, prohibits tje kinds of
informed trading that Part IV suggests should be prohibited and allows kinds it suggests
should be allowed.
215. Council Directive art. 2(1).
216. Id. at art. 1(l).
217. Council Directive § 31. For expository convenience, the text and notes from hereon will be written as
though the Directive has direct effect on persons engaging in, or associated with, informed trading. In fact, an EU
directive simply directs member states to adopt legislation that has these effects.
218. Id. at art. 1(1).
219. Id. at art. 2(l).
220. The definition of "inside information" includes only information "likely to have a significant effect on
[price]." Id.
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b. Tippers and Tippees with Regard to Information from within the Issuer
With regard to tippers and tippees of information from within the issuer, the Directive,
judged by the recommendations in Part IV, is in some ways superior, and in other ways
inferior, to Rule 1 Ob-5 as currently interpreted. For there to be a violation, the Directive
does not require that an issuer insider receive a personal benefit for making the tip of
nonpublic material information. Instead, it has a general prohibition against "disclosing
inside information to any other person," but excepts disclosures made "in the normal course
of the exercise of [the disclosing person's] employment, profession or duties."221 The way
that this general prohibition and exception operate in combination does not appear to work
as well as Rule 1Ob-5 in avoiding chilling analyst interviews because the scheme does not
seem to recognize that such interviews are two-sided. The exception works as well as the
personal benefit test (or our proposed alternative) in immunizing issuer representatives
participating in such interviews, thus avoiding chilling their participation. However,
contrary to the recommendations here and Rule lOb-5, analysts who trade on material
infonnation received in such interviews, or who privately recommend that their employer
or others trade on the information, would be in violation,222 thus chilling analyst
willingness to engage in such interviews.
The Directive has a catchall provision, Article 4, that relates to any person beyond
those with respect to whom there are specified prohibitions relating to informed trading
and tipping. Article 4 prohibits trading or tipping if such a person "possesses inside
information while that person knows, or ought to have known, that it is inside
information."223 It is therefore much easier to make the case that such person has
committed a violation than currently under Rule lOb-5, where, without our proposed
alternative approach, it is necessary to show that the person knew of the original tipper's
personal benefit. Thus, the Directive's provisions more effectively deter a range of trades
based on information from inside an issuer that the analysis in Part IV finds socially
undesirable: trades by direct tippees outside the analyst interview situation and by indirect
tippees generally.
c. Trades Based on Information Originating from within a Non-issuer Institution
Trades based on nonpublic material information initially selectively disclosed by an
insider of a non-issuer institution are treated differently under the Directive depending on
the nature of the information. Consider first the situation where the information is purely
the results of an analysis. Informed trading based on this information, whether the trader
receives it directly or indirectly, appears to be allowed because it is not considered "inside
221. Id. at art. 3(1)(a).
222. The analyst would be prohibited from trading by the Directive's Article 2(l)(c) and from advising others
to do so by its Article 3(b).
223. Council Directive art. 4.
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information."224 This is so even if the trader has good reason to believe that the institution
did not authorize the information's disclosure or the trader has some kind of duty of
confidentiality to her source, situations involving socially undesirable trades according to
22526Part IV that would violate Rule lOb-5.226
Next, consider the situation where the analysis leads to a plan to engage in a purchase
(for example, a takeover bid) or to sell enough of the issuer's stock to likely have a
significant effect on price. Suppose the institution discloses the plan to a select group of
traders. Knowledge of the planned transaction would fit the definition of "inside
information" even though the analysis that prompted the planned transaction would not.
The Directive's catchall Article 4 would appear to prohibit all trades by outsiders based on
such information as long as the trader has good reason to believe that it is material and
nonpublic.227 These are trades that our Part IV analysis suggests should be allowed228 and
would not violate Rule 1Ob-5. 229
d. Summary
In sum, the reach of the Directive's informed trading prohibitions is somewhat
different than the reach of Rule 1Ob-5's prohibitions. Each system prohibits some tips and
trades that our analysis suggests should be prohibited and that the other system fails to
prohibit. The Directive also prohibits some trades that our analysis suggests should be not
prohibited and that are not prohibited under Rule lOb-5. Overall, the Directive is not
hobbled by the personal benefit rule test nor does it require a showing of knowledge by the
trader of a prior breach of some duty in many situations where it would be socially desirable
to punish a trade. It is less attuned, however, to the need to allow certain profitable trades
that create incentives to generate price-accuracy-improving information.
2. Insider Trading Prohibition Act
A bipartisan Congressional group, aided by our colleague Professor John C. Coffee,
introduced in the 114th Congress a proposed statute,230 the Insider Trading Prohibition Act
(the "Trading Act"), 23 1 that would provide a comprehensive scheme to regulate informed
trading. The Trading Act prohibits trades in an issuer's securities if the trader is in
224. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part IV.D.
226. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. Such a trade would very likely be a Rule lOb-5 violation in
circuits that do not impose the personal benefit rule in cases where the information is not from within the issuer,
the position that we believe is doctrinally correct. See supra Part V.A.1.b.iv;.Part V.2.d.
227. This would not include the planned purchase or sale itself, which would be prompted by the analysis,
not by the information that it was planned.
228. See supra Part V.A. I.b.ii;.Part V.2.d.
229. Id.
230. See John C. Coffee, Jr., How to Get Away with Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/23/opinion/how-to-get-away-with-insider-trading.html?_r-0.
231. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
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possession of material nonpublic information and the trader "knows, or recklessly
disregards, that such information has been obtained wrongfully, or that such [trade] would
constitute a wrongful use of such information."232 It also prohibits communication of such
information if the communication is wrongful or the communicator has good reason to
believe the information was obtained wrongfully and the recipient (or a direct or indirect
tippee of the recipient) predictably trades on it. 33 A trade or communication would be a
wrongful use of such information if it is obtained by such illegal acts as theft or constitutes
misappropriation of the information.234 Knowledge that information has been wrongfully
obtained requires only that the trader or communicator "was aware, or recklessly
disregarded that such information was wrongfully obtained or communicated." 235
a. Fundamental Value, Announcement, and Issuer Insider Informed Trading
The Trading Act would allow fundamental value-informed trading because such
information is not wrongfully obtained, nor is it contrary to any other law or obligation.
The Trading Act also would allow announcement trading because it is based on public
information. It also would prohibit issuer insiders from trading on material non-public
information from inside the issuer because, as a breach of the relationship of trust that
issuer insiders have with the issuer's shareholders, it is wrongful. The Trading Act would
permit trading by issuer insiders on the basis of immaterial information from inside the
issuer because the Trading Act only relates to material information. Thus, in all these
regards, the Trading Act, like Rule 1 Ob-5, prohibits all the kinds of informed trading that
Part IV suggests should be prohibited and allows all the kinds that it suggests should be
allowed.
b. Tippers and Tippees with Regard to Information from within the Issuer
With regard to tippers and tippees of information from within the issuer, the Trading
Act, judged by the recommendations in Part IV, is superior to Rule lOb-5, though still not
optimal in its reach. Consider analyst interviews. The Trading Act, although it does not
explicitly include a personal benefit test, would appear to avoid chilling analyst interviews.
If an issuer representative authorized to conduct an analyst interview accidentally provides
material inside information, he has not communicated the information wrongfully, which
is what would be required for a violation. Because the information was not wrongfully
communicated to the analyst, she also would not violate the Trading Act by trading on it
or communicating it, directly or indirectly, to someone who predictably trades on it. For
the same reasons neither of the Trading Act's twin prohibitions-wrongful use and use of
wrongfully obtained information-is triggered if the information received by the analyst is
then passed on to others (beyond the analyst's principal) who trade on it or recommunicate
it to yet others who predictably trade on it.
232. Id. § 16A(a).
233. Id. § 16A(b)(2).
234. Id. § 16A(c)(1)(C).
235. Id. § 16A(c)(2).
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The immunization of the issuer representative and the analyst is consistent with our
policy conclusions. The immunization of the indirect recipients is not consistent with our
policy recommendations: the indirect recipient's trades result in the same damage to
liquidity as trades by insiders and immunizing them is not necessary to avoid chilling
analyst interviews. They would be immunized in a Rule lOb-5 regime also, however, and
so the Trading Act is not a step backward in this regard, though not as good as our proposed
alternative.
Relative to the current Rule 1 Ob-5 case-law based regime, the major advantage of the
Trading Act with respect to information from within an issuer relates to direct and indirect
tippees outside of the analyst interview context. The Trading Act prohibits trades and
tipping by persons possessing material nonpublic information "if such person knows, or
recklessly disregards, that such information has been obtained wrongfully."236 Unlike the
Rule lOb-5 regime, the Trading Act explicitly does not require that the person to "know
the specific means by which the information was obtained or communicated, or whether
any personal benefit was paid or promised."237 This eliminates major obstacles under the
current Rule lOb-5 regime to imposing sanctions on tippees, especially indirect ones.
Again, however, it does not go as far as would an optimal regime, which would prohibit
any trade or tip if the indirect tippee has good reason to know that the nonpublic material
information came from within the issuer.
c. Trades based on information originating from within a non-issuer institution
Consider now the reach of the Trading Act's prohibitions with respect to trades based
on nonpublic material information generated by a non-issuer institution and traded on by
an insider of the institution or by an outsider. We concluded earlier that such trades are
socially desirable if approved by the institution and, in case of a trade by any indirect
outside recipient of the information, approved by the intermediary recipient or
recipients. 23 The basis of approval comes from what can grow to be a whole network of
agreements and duties specifying who is allowed to trade and under what conditions. We
concluded that any trading not approved by this network of agreements and duties is
socially undesirable. 239
The Trading Act helps in two ways to prevent trades outside of what is permitted by
this network of agreements. First, it prohibits anyone from trading on the information, or
communicating it to others who predictably trade on it, where such trading or tipping is
wrongful. Thus, the Trading Act is violated by an insider, or any outside recipient, direct
or indirect, who trades or tips contrary to his agreement with his source or to some other
legal duty.240 This prohibition, therefore, reinforces the already existing legal sanctions for
236. H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. § 16A(a) (2015).
237. Id. § 16A(C)(2).
238. See supra Part IV.D.1.
239. See supra Part IV.D.2.
240. H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. § 16A(c)(C) (2015).
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the recipient's breach of contract with his source or of some other duty.
Second, the Trading Act prohibits trades or tips based on the information where the
241
user has good reason to believe it was wrongfully obtained or communicated. These are
persons not themselves bound by any agreement or other obligation not to trade or tip.
Instead they receive the information as the result of a breach by someone who was so
bound. This prohibition acts as a backstop to help prevent trades that would otherwise occur
as a result of the breach by the person who was so bound.
In these regards, the reach of the Trading Act's prohibitions are identical with the
reach of what we believe, doctrinally and policy wise, is the better view of reach of Rule
1Ob-5 based on the misappropriation theory, the view that does not insert the personal
benefit test. The Trading Act's contains an explicit provision that no showing of knowledge
of personal benefit is required to establish a case based on the use of information
wrongfully obtained or communicated.
An optimal regime would go further, however, and prohibit any trade based on
material nonpublic information relating to an issuer generated by an outside institution
where the trader (1) has good reason to believe that it originated with that institution, and
(2) does not have a good reason to believe that trade is in accordance with what is called
for by the network agreements and duties associated with the authorized dispersion of the
information and approval to trade on it. Given the value of material nonpublic information,
it is predictable that the institution that generated it and each subsequent legitimate
recipient would lay down terms for its use such that, if the terms were respected, the
information would not be available to be freely picked up and traded upon. Thus, if
someone trades on the basis of such nonpublic information that she has reason to believe
came from the institution and she does not know the route by which the information got to
her, the likelihood is that the trade is not in accordance with what is called for by the
applicable network of agreements relating to this piece of information. Accordingly, the
trade is socially undesirable.
3. An Alternative Approach
As the preceding discussion shows, judged against what would be optimal, the reach
of the EU Market Abuse Directive's prohibitions on informed trading is in some ways an
improvement upon the reach of the current U.S. Rule lOb-5 regime and in some ways is
less satisfactory. The proposed Insider Trading Regulation Act is an unambiguous
improvement, but still falls short of the optimal set of prohibitions.
One way for the United States to have an optimal regime is to adopt a broad scale
statute that goes a step further than the proposed Insider Trading Regulation Act by
including within its prohibitions the socially harmful trades specified above that the
Trading Act does not reach. However, a preferable and more conservative approach would
be to recognize that the current Rule 1Ob-5 regulation already gets most things right and
provides a rich set of precedents. For an extended period of time, these precedents will
generally provide more predictable outcomes than will a whole new statutory scheme with
241. Id. § 16A(b).
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all the interpretative issues of first impression that its wording will inevitably raise. All
that is really necessary to convert the current Rule 1 Ob-5 regime into one that imposes the
optimal range of informed trading prohibitions is a narrowly crafted statute that
appropriately clarifies the ambiguities in the current case law and provides the desirable
extensions in the range of prohibitions.
As we have seen, all of the shortcomings of the Rule lOb-5 regime relate to tipping
and trading by direct and indirect tippees. With regard to material nonpublic information
from within an issuer, the statute should provide that the personal benefit test only apply
to an issuer insider and his direct recipient, not to indirect tippees, and that evidentiary
burden be reversed so that it simply provides a defendant with an affirmative defense if he
can produce persuasive evidence that the insider source disclosed for a reason other than
personal benefit. Other than the trades and communications that are covered by this limited
personal benefit rule, the statute should prohibit any trade (and any tip that predictably
results in a trade) where the trader or tipper is in possession of material nonpublic
information and has good reason to believe that it came from within the issuer. The statute
should also clarify that the personal benefit rule does not apply to trades or tips based on
material nonpublic information generated by an institution other than the issuer.
Finally, as discussed just above in the analysis of the Trading Act, the object of
regulating tips and trades based on such information is to maximize the incentives for such
institutions to generate such information with the attendant socially useful enhancement of
share price accuracy. To accomplish this, the statute should prohibit any tip or trade based
on such information where the trader has good reason to believe that it originated with that
institution and does not have a good reason to believe that (1) the institution generating the
information authorized its initial disclosure; (2) each subsequent recommunication, if any,
was authorized by institution that received it (where the recipient in fact was an institution
rather than an individual), was made in accordance with the terms imposed by the
originating institution and by each preceding recommunicating entity, and was not
prohibited by any other obligation arising from its status; and (3) the tip or trade itself is in
accordance with the terms imposed by the originating institution and by each preceding
recommunicating institution and is not prohibited by any other obligation of the tipper or
trader arising out of its status.
E. Mandatory Affirmative Disclosure
The United States, through multiple trigger mechanisms, imposes its Exchange Act
periodic disclosure regime on most of the country's publicly traded issuers.242 This regime
requires the issuer, on a regular basis, to answer in a filing a large number of questions
concerning its business and finances. The most detailed filing is the annual 10-K filing,
with some of its questions requiring updating each quarter in a 10-Q filing. Specified
important events such as entering into important agreements, changes in control, senior
242. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1934) (prohibiting the trading of a
security on a national securities exchange that is not registered on such an exchange); 15 U.S.C. § 12(g) (1934)
(requiring issuers with stocks with more than specific numbers of holders of record or assets to register as public
companies); 15 U.S.C. § 15(d) (1934) (requiring registration in connection with a public offering).
8912018]
The Journal of Corporation Law
officer changes and material asset acquisitions and sales trigger an 8-K filing obligation
within four business days of the event. The U.S. periodic disclosure regime also includes
Regulation FD, which is intended to be an antidote to some corporations' practice of
selectively disclosing material information to certain outsiders who are expected to trade
on it. Each European country has its own somewhat different mandatory disclosure system,
but they are all shaped by an EU directive mandating that they all have a requirement that
the issuer disclose all new nonpublic information as soon as possible.
1. The Relationship of Mandatory Affirmative Disclosure to Informed Trading
One purpose of affirmative disclosure requirements is to directly make share prices
more accurate. The efficient market hypothesis tells us that once information is publicly
disclosed this way, it is fully reflected in price very quickly.243 Affirmative disclosure
requirements, however, have a second important function as well: reducing or eliminating
informed trading based on the information and the reduction in liquidity that accompanies
such trading. The less information from within an issuer is nonpublic, the less insiders and
their tippees can engage in their socially undesirable type of informed trade.
The benefits of mandatory disclosure go beyond this, however. The increased liquidity
in an issuer's stock resulting from less issuer insider informed trading means that
fundamental value traders face lower trading costs and hence will increase their level of
activity. In other words, there will be less crowding out of this socially valuable
fundamental value informed trading. Admittedly, because securities filings are pubic
announcements, more mandatory disclosure means there will be more announcement
trading, which is also socially undesirable. However, announcement traders have only a
very short time to act and so their trades in aggregate damage liquidity much less than
would have the trades by insiders and their tippees. Moreover, even this minor damage to
liquidity could be largely avoided if the release of the content of a filing was postponed
until after the end of regular trading hours and firms were similarly constrained in their
own announcements absent a pressing need such as stemming a developing flood of trading
by insiders and their tippees.
Mandatory disclosure can favorably affect the level of fundamental value informed
trading in another way as well. When an issuer discloses more about itself, fundamental
value informed traders may find it easier, and thus more profitable, to analyze additional
information about that issuer, simply because the disclosed information is a worthwhile
input that informs further discovery. Thus, ceteris paribus, it will be more profitable for an
investor to gather and analyze new information concerning an issuer that has disclosed
243. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970).
244. This result could be effected not only by government regulation, but instead by stock exchange rules.
Currently the NYSE provides that where a disclosure is to be made during trading hours, NYSE should be notified,
and it will consider whether trading should be temporarily halted. N.Y.S.E. Manual (CCH) § 202.06(B).F.
NASDAQ has a similar rule. NASDAQ Rule IM-5250-1.
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basic financial information than an issuer who has not made such a disclosure. 245
2. Regulation FD
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD),246 adopted in August 2000, is intended to stop
the practice of "selective disclosure." Selective disclosure involves an issuer who discloses
material information to certain outsiders, such as analysts, major shareholders, or other
institutional investors, who are likely to trade on that information, but does not disclose it
to the general public.247 Reg. FD provides that where material information is intentionally
disclosed to such outsiders, the issuer must disclose the information to the general public
at the same time, and where it is unintentional, the issuer must make the information
publicly available promptly thereafter.248
On the whole, the effects of Reg. FD are consistent with what our analysis in Part IV
recommends. This analysis suggests that it would be undesirable for issuers to buy or sell
their securities while in possession of material nonpublic information and that tipping by
an issuer would therefore also be undesirable. The Reg. FD ban on intentional selective
disclosure therefore makes sense. So does the requirement of prompt public disclosure after
an unintentional selective disclosure of material information, especially when combined
with the more limited personal benefit rule for Rule 1 Ob-5 actions recommend here.249 On
the one hand, we want to avoid chilling analyst interviews, which is the rationale for the
limited personal benefit rule. On the other hand, that is the sole purpose of the personal
benefit test. If, by accident, material information is released in an analyst interview, it is
undesirable that it become the basis of informed trading. Reg. FD does the best that can be
done to minimize this informed trading without chilling analyst interviews (and related
discussion among financial professionals).
There has been considerable controversy in the empirical literature as to whether Reg.
FD improves price accuracy and whether it lowers the cost of capital.250 A number of
possible stories can be told in these regards.251 The imposition of Reg. FD might have
245. While important, the details of this discussion are beyond the scope of this article. See FOX, FINANCE
AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 55, at 34-43; John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 728-29 (1984); Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note
99, at 405.
246. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2011).
247. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 247, 239).
248. Id.
249. See supra Part V.A.2.d.
250. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal et al., Who Is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-Side
Analysts Following the SEC's Fair Disclosure Rules, 79 J. Bus. 2811, 2822 (2006) (finding that analyst forecasts
become less accurate following Reg FD); Zhihong Chen et
al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost ofEquity Capital, 15 REv. ACCT. STUD. 106, 139 (2010) (finding
that the cost of capital decreased following Reg FD).
251. See Merritt B. Fox, Regulation FD and Foreign Issuers: Globalization's Strains and Opportunities, 41
VA. J. INT'L L. 653, 673-78 (2001).
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decreased price accuracy because previously an issuer, by providing analysts with tidbits
of selective disclosure of material information, may have been able to attract the following
of analysts who would otherwise not find following the issuer worthwhile. 252
Alternatively, Reg. FD might have increased price accuracy because it ended a corrupt
game by which an issuer gave such tidbits in return for overly positive analyst reports. 253
Reg. FD's reduction in the amount of informed trading would definitely improve liquidity
254
and have a favorable effect on the cost of capital. If Reg. FD increased price accuracy
as well, then it would be an unambiguous improvement from a social welfare
perspective. 2 55
Regardless of which story is correct, there is a better solution that would both reduce
the amount of informed trading and allow issuers to attract share-price-accuracy enhancing
analyst followings: keep Reg. FD but allow issuers openly to pay analysts to follow them
in the same way that they pay accountants to certify their accounts. Two features of such
an arrangement could help assure objectivity. One is the development of an analyst
business where a reputation for objectivity is an asset that, because the reputation makes
its reports have more value, that the analyst would not want to jeopardize by giving a falsely
optimistic report in return for getting business. The other is to require that the arrangement
involve a long-term contract spanning a few years, so that a bad report does not lead to an
issuer dropping the analyst in retaliation.
3. European Continuous Disclosure Regime
The EU Market Abuse Directive subjects issuers to a continuous disclosure regime
concerning inside information.256 This regime requires an issuer to disclose as quickly as
possible inside information directly involving that issuer.257 This approach has virtues and
defects. If an issuer suspects that insiders or their tippees are trading based on the internal
information, then it is certainly desirable for an issuer to publicly disclose that information.
However, if there is no reason to suspect insider trading, the issuer may have a good
business reason to keep the information secret, which would benefit the shareholders by
allowing the issuer to generate a larger expected cash flow. In terms of the real economy
efficiency benefits from greater price accuracy, little is gained from a slightly earlier
disclosure of this information. Even if the issuer can be exempted if it has such a business
reason, placing the burden on the issuer to show the business reason may lead to earlier
disclosure on average than is desirable out of a desire to avoid the cost and risks of a fight
252. Id. at 674-75.
253. Id. at 677-78.
254. See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining how transactions with informed traders impact liquidity suppliers).
255. Id.
256. See Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC) 7 (31) (delineating rules for handling market
manipulation).
257. Id. Article 6 states, "Member States shall ensure that issuers of financial instruments inform the public
as soon as possible of inside information which directly concerns the said issuers."
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with regulators.
F. Return of Insider Profits
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is an express prohibition of certain forms
of insider trading under federal law. 258 Section 16(b) requires insiders to disgorge to their
firm any profit they gain from "any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any
equity security" of the company within a six-month period. Although Section 10(b) is far
better known, Sectionl6(b) generates a considerable amount of interpretation and
litigation.259
Critics have suggested that Sectionl6(b) is ineffective because all the insider has to
do is wait six months to engage in the reverse transaction that realizes her profit. This
Article, though, suggests it can be quite useful. It dramatically reduces insiders' incentives
to trade based on any form of material non-public inside information, other than
information that should have a considerably long-term impact. This is because regardless
of what information motivates the insider to engage in an initial transaction, whether
purchasing or selling, the insider will have to wait six months before transacting again.
During those six months, a large number of market-moving events are likely to impact a
company's stock price. Accordingly, Sectionl6(b) makes trading based on inside
information less attractive by mandating that insiders can only rebalance their portfolios
after a considerable amount of time, thereby leaving them in a riskier position during the
interim because of the reduced portfolio diversification due to the inside trade.260 The kind
of information that will remain rational to trade on will be information likely to have a
price impact only in a very long period of time, which is precisely the kind of information
this Article suggests is most socially valuable for insiders to trade on.261
G. Market Structure Rules
Rules governing the structure of the stock market can also be tailored to help promote
socially desirable trading and reduce socially undesirable trading. This is especially so with
announcement trading, which we find socially undesirable, but which, because it involves
information that is already public, is not prohibited by Rule lob-5 and in any event would
be difficult to cost-effectively regulate this way.
We will consider two potential market structure responses briefly here-one
258. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
259. See Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of
Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2091 (1994) (nothing "section 16 has been subject of more
interpretations ... than any other provision").
260. Id.at2107-38.
261. A derivative suit under state corporation law can provide a similar remedy to Section 16(b). The theory
is that a corporate officer or director that trades on inside information breaches her fiduciary duty to the
corporation, and therefore should return her profits. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y.
1969)
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involving stock exchange announcement rules and the other involving the regulation of the
electronic connections among stock exchanges and with liquidity suppliers.
1. Stock Exchange Announcement Rules
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Listed Company Manual requires firms to
quickly release material new information. Section 202.05 ("Timely Disclosure of Material
News Developments") provides that listed companies should "release quickly to the public
any news or information which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the
market for its securities."262 Section 202.06 ("Procedure for Public Release of Information;
Trading Halts") similarly requires that "substantive items of unusual or non-recurrent
nature," such as dividend announcements, mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, stock splits,
or major management changes "should be handled on an immediate release basis." 263
A rule that that a listed issuer should disclose important news as soon as is practical
makes sense in terms of our analysis when an issuer has reason to suspect that important
yet-to-be-announced news is being used as the basis of insider trading. Otherwise,
however, it would be better that the issuer be required to wait until after trading has stopped
for the day. To announce during the trading day is to invite announcement trading. Thus,
revising this NYSE rule to require announcements after trading hours-so that the
announcement will essentially be known to market makers and market participants alike
when active trading resumes-would be beneficial.
2. Market Connection Regulation
The modem market's primary liquidity suppliers, high-frequency traders (HFTs),
utilize a number of technologies. Stocks of any significance trade on each of a number of
different trading venues, the NYSE being just one. Each venue is essentially just a
computer (a "matching engine") that matches standing limit orders, which constitute the
bids and offers, with incoming marketable orders.264 The primary source of these bids and
offers are the modem market's primary liquidity suppliers, HFTs.265 HFTs typically have
computers "co-located" right next to each venues matching engine. Each of an HFTs co-
located computers is connected to each other one by high speed fiber optic cable, whereby
it constantly updates information concerning transactions occurring in every stock in which
they regularly trade, as well as changes in the bids and offers posted by others on each
trading venue. This information is automatically fed into a computer that uses algorithms
to change its own bids and offers posted at each venue. 266
Through this setup, an HFT can learn of a transaction at one venue and change its
262. NYSE Listed Company Manual, NYSE (2008), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/.
263. Id.
264. See supra Part Il1.B (discussing market attributes that impact evaluative goals).
265. Id.
266. See Charles R. Korsmo, High Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523,
523-40 (2014) (defining attributes of HFTs).
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quotes at every other venue with lightning speed. So, for instance, an algorithm can learn
of a very large transaction at one venue, suggesting large orders may also be heading to the
other venues that would transact against the HFTs' bids or offers at these venues. The HFT
can potentially make these changes before these large orders arrive at the other venues.
Critics have labeled this practice of changing quotes "electronic front running" and
have suggested various ways of stopping it involving rules relating to the use
connections.267 This may be too narrow a view. Because the persons sending these large
orders are informed traders, the availability of electronic front running allows HFTs to
make these informed trades more expensive. By being better protected this way, HFTs face
lower costs from dealing with informed traders and hence in a competitive business narrow
their spreads. 268
Electronic front running probably has quite different effects on different types of
informed trading. Trading in large amounts in rapid time is expensive to do as a general
matter because it involves running through the book transacting against less and less
favorable quotes. Thus, a trader will not do it unless the information motivating one's trade
is rapidly going to become fully public. The ultimate example of such a trader is an
announcement trader-the person who trades in the brief time after the announcement
before the price has fully adjusted. The next best example is an insider who knows of a
corporate announcement to be made very soon. Where the information one possesses has
a longer-term horizon before becoming public-fundamental information--there is no
reason to trade in massive size rapidly. Thus, electronic front running stands to make
announcement trading, which is socially undesirable, less profitable, and may do the same
for some issuer insider trading as well. Yet it should have no direct effect on fundamental
value trading.269 Indeed, by discouraging announcement traders and perhaps some insider
traders and hence lowering spreads, electronic front running is likely to help fundamental
value traders, which is a socially desirable activity. All of this cautions against a precipitous
adoption of reforms aimed at ending electronic front running.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article provides a general framework for analyzing the social desirability of
different types of informed trading. Decades of debate surrounding insider trading have
made both academics and the public widely familiar with one type of informed
trading-information obtained from within a stock's issuer or other institution, i.e., insider
trading. The universe of informed trading, however, is much larger.
All informed trading makes share prices more accurate, which enhances efficiency in
the real economy. But all informed trading also, through the trading losses imposed on
liquidity suppliers, tends to make markets less liquid, which is costly in efficiency terms.
There is thus a fundamental trade-off in how informed trading affects the two principal
267. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014). We analyze the practice
elsewhere. See The New Stock Market, supra note 24, at 226-32 (analyzing electric front running as one of the
eight most controversial new stock market practices).
268. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the issuer as source).
269. See The New Stock Market, supra note 24, at 236-38.
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social functions served by the stock market-accurate pricing and providing liquidity.
We analyzed all of the distinct types of informed trading, and argued that doing so
illuminates how the different types of private information nonetheless vary markedly in
their social value. The tradeoff between the social benefits from price accuracy and the
social costs of decreased liquidity depends importantly on the time horizon for when the
improvement in price accuracy would otherwise occur without the informed trade. Some
types of informed trading, such as announcement trading, impose a social cost, through
negative effects on liquidity, while creating no social benefit. Other forms of private
information, such as fundamental value information, also impose a cost on liquidity, but
create important positive social benefits in terms of the incentives they create for producing
price-accuracy-improving information that then gets reflected in price. Trading based on
various forms of confidential information from inside issuers and from inside other
institutions can now be placed in a broader context, revealing that while some types are
clearly undesirable, others may, in fact, be useful. Finally, we canvassed a variety of
regulatory reforms that could reduce the profitability of announcement-based trading and
thus its prevalence.
